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I. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this certified question are the Plaintiffs/Appellants, Gayle Burns, 
and I.M.B, a minor (hereinafter "Burns" or "Appellants"), and the defendant Michael J. 
Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter "Agency"). 
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OPENING BRIEF 
IV. 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction upon this matter is vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Rule 41, Utah R.App.(a) and (c), Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Rule 41, Utah RApp.P. (a). Authorization to answer questions of 
law. The Utah Supreme Court may answer a question of Utah law certified 
to it by a court of the United States when requested to do so by such 
certifying court acting in accordance with the provisions of this rule if the 
state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying 
court is uncertain. 
Rule 41 Utah R.App.P.(c). Certification order. 
(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme 
Court and shall state: 
(c)( 1 )(A) the question of law to be answered; 
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of 
law in a proceeding pending before the certifying court; and 
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question certified to the Utah Supreme Court: 
Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in 
the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent' in a record to 
being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the 
donor's death under Utah intestacy law, Utah Code Ann. §788-15-707 
Traditional standards of review do not apply to certified questions from the Federal 
District Court to the Utah Supreme Court, if there is no decision to affirm or reverse a 
1 
lower court's decision. Egbert v. Nissan North America. Inc.. 2007, 167 P.3d 1058, 585 
Ut. Adv. Rep. 16, 2007 UT 64. 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
78B-15-102. Definitions 
(1) "Adjudicated father" means a man who has been adjudicated by 
a tribunal to be the father of a child. (Bold not in original) 
(3) "Assisted reproduction" means a method of causing pregnancy 
other than sexual intercourse. The term includes: 
(a) intraurterine insemination; 
(b) donation of eggs; 
(c) donation of embryos; 
(d) in vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; and 
(e) intracytoplasmic sperm injection. 
(5) "Birth mother" means the biological mother of a child 
(6) "Child" means an individual of any age whose parentage may be 
determined under this chapter. 
(9) "Determination of parentage" means the establishment of the 
parent-child relationship by the signing of a valid declaration of paternity 
under Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act, or adjudication by a 
tribunal. (Bold not in original) 
(18) "Parent-child relationship" means the legal relationship between { 
a child and a parent of the child. The term includes the mother-child 
relationship and the father-child relationship. 
(22) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible 
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable 
in perceivable form. { 
(26) "Tribunal" means a court of law, administrative agency, or 
quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support 
orders or to determine parentage. 
78B-15-104. Adjudication - Jurisdiction 
(2) The district court and the juvenile court have jurisdiction over 
proceedings under Parts 7 (Assisted Reproduction) and 8. 
I 
2 
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788-15-201(2). The father-child relationship is established between 
a man and a child by (e) the man having consented to assisted reproduction 
by a woman under Part 7, Assisted Reproduction, which resulted in the 
birth of the child: 
78B-15-202. No discrimination based on marital status. A child 
bom to parents who are not married to each other whose paternity has been 
determined under this chapter has the same rights under the law as a child 
bom to parents who are married to each other. 
78B-15-703. Husband's paternity of child of assisted 
reproduction. If a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted 
reproduction by his wife as provided in Section 78B-15-704, he is the father 
of the resulting child bom to his wife. 
78B-15-704. Consent to assisted reproduction. (1) A consent to 
assisted reproduction by a married woman must be in a record signed by the 
woman and her husband. 
78B-15-707. Parental status of deceased spouse. If a spouse dies 
before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased spouse is not a 
parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented in a 
record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased 
spouse would be a parent of the child. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellants brought this action to obtain surviving child's and mother's benefits 
through the Social Security Act upon the death of their father/husband, Michael Bums 
and his Social Security earnings record. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
In September, 2005, Appellant applied for two types of Social Security Survivor's 
3 
benefits - surviving child's insurance benefits on behalf of the minor child, LM.B, and 
surviving mother's insurance benefits based upon the earnings records of Michael Bums, 
the deceased father/husband, (tr 50-55). The Agency denied the claims initially and 
upon reconsideration found that Appellants had not shown that LM.B. was Mr. Bums' 
"dependent child" as defined in the Social Security Act. (tr 56-60, 64-66). A hearing 
was held on October 3, 2007 with Administrative Law Judge Donald R. Jensen presiding 
and issuing a decision on August 22, 2008 reversing the denial of benefits, and finding 
that based on the record evidence the Appellants were entitled to surviving child's and 
mother's benefits on Mr. Bums' earnings records, (tr 28-39). On February 6, 2009, the 
Agency's Appeals Council found "good cause to reopen the case pursuant to 20 CFR 
§404.988 and 404.989 due to legal errors in the ALJ's decision" (tr 17-25) and issued a 
decision on August 18, 2009 alleging errors in the ALJ's decision and concluded that the 
Appellants had not shown that LM.B. was "the dependent child" of Mr. Bums as defined 
under the Social Security Act and that the Appellants were not entitled to surviving 
child's and mother's benefits on Mr. Bums'earnings record. (tr4-16). Thereafter 
Appellants filed a Complaint in the United States District Court to be heard de novo on 
October 14, 2009 with a redacted amended copy filed on October 16, 2009 (not in 
transcript). The Agency filed a timely Answer to said Complaint (not in transcript). 
Thereafter the United States Federal District Court did certify the question to the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah R.App.P., 41(a), and the Utah Supreme Court issued an 
4 
Order of Acceptance on August 5, 2010. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Michael Bums married Appellant Gayle Bums on August 24, 1997. (tr 68). 
2. In April 2000, Mr. Bums was told by his doctors that he had Non Hodgkins 
Lymphoma, and a tumor behind his sternum, and he would require chemotherapy and 
radiation therapy. He was told that he had a 95% chance of survival with chemotherapy 
and radiation treatments, which treatment would most likely leave Mr. Bums sterile, (tr 
231). 
3. Mr. Bums and his wife, Appellant Gayle M. Bums, signed a Semen Storage 
Agreement on May 30, 2000. Thereafter, Mr. Bums deposited samples of his semen for 
cryopreservation. (tr 69-72, 108-111). 
4. The Semen Storage Agreement, Section 1 stated: "The Donor has consulted 
with a doctor and it has been determined that the Donor may be an appropriate candidate 
to have his semen collected, evaluated, frozen and stored for his future use or other 
possible uses as hereinafter set forth. (Bold not in original.) Semen is desired by the 
donor for one more of the following reasons: 
A. Prior to vasectomy; 
5 
B. Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy;1 
C. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications; 
D. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic environmental conditions; 
E. Prior to travel or extended absence of the donor; 
F. Prior to artificial insemination; 
G. Prior to shipment of the semen to another location; 
H. Or other reasons deemed appropriate by my Doctor, (tr 69, 108). 
5. Mr. Bums also signed in the Semen Storage Agreement a statement: 
In the event of the death of the donor, the donor would like his vials 
of semen (initial 1 of the items below): 
(A) Destroyed 
(B) Maintained in storage for future donation to Gayle Burns (fill 
in name and relationship)2 will assume all obligations and 
terms described in this contract. MB [Mr. Bums' 
initials], (tr 70-71, 109-110). 
6. On March 24, 2001, Mr. Bums died of cancer-related complications in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, (tr 78). 
7. On May 3, 2003, Appellant had herself artificially inseminated with Mr. 
Bums'cryopreserved semen, (tr 113-14). 
Please note that no instructions were in the document to sign, circle, check or 
initial to any of these "reasons." Someone, most likely Mr. Bums, circled choice "B, 
Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy." 
2Filled in by Mr. Bums. 
i 
i 
8. Appellant gave birth to I.M.B. in Salt Lake County, Utah on December 23, 
2003 as a result of the artificial insemination, (tr 113). 
9. Initially I.M.B.'s birth certificate did not reflect the name of his father, 
Michael Burns, (tr 117). However, a request by Appellant for an amended birth 
certificate (tr 116) reflecting Michael Burns as I.M.B.'s father was granted on September 
3, 2004 by the Utah Department of Health, Office of Vital Records and Statistics, (tr 79-
83,118-20). 
10. The Social Security denials and approvals process then occurred as outlined 
in Appellants' Statement of the Case (B), "Course of Proceedings and Dispositions," 
brief, p. 3-4. 
11. Elizabeth Park, the deceased wage earner's sister, was appointed as a 
special administrator In the Matter of the Estate of Michael Burns (DOD 3/24/01), 
Case No. 083900243 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake Division, Utah, (tr 
174-75). (Signed copies of formal probate documents not in transcript but in Appellants' 
Addendum.) 
12. Appellant filed a Petition for Determination of Paternity In the Matter of 
I.M.B. (DOB 12/23/03, a minor child, on November 9, 2007 in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Case No. 074904953 before the Honorable 
Anthony B. Quinn. (tr 104-121). 
13. A hearing was held on March 18, 2008, with testimony being taken from 
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Mrs. Burns and Elizabeth Park, Special Administrator, and Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and an Order submitted and signed by the court on April 15, 2008. 
(tr 167-75). 
14. In said Conclusions of Law it indicated that Petitioner had met their burden 
of proof and there was clear and convincing evidence that I.M.B. was the son of Michael 
A. Bums. Specifically in said Order, Judge Quinn stated, "That all rights arising from 
said parent/child relationship, including those of care, custody, support and 
inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of I.M.B,, a minor." (tr 168-9). (Bold 
not in original.) 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellants opine that the Semen Storage Agreement was sufficient under §78B-
15-704( 1) and §78B-15-707 to show that Michael Burns "consented in a record" that if a 
child were to be born by assisted reproduction from his cryopreserved semen after his 
death, the child would be considered his child and eligible as his heir under Utah intestacy 
law, and thus eligible for surviving child Social Security benefits. ( 
• X. 
ARGUMENT 
Under the Social Security Act, the surviving child of a deceased insured wage 
earner may apply for insurance benefits on the Social Security earnings records of the 
i 
8 
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deceased parent. Also, under the Social Security program a surviving natural parent of a 
surviving child is entitled to surviving parent's insurance benefits based on the Social 
Security earnings records of the same deceased insured wage earner. 
Because both I.M.B.'s and Mrs. Bums' entitlement to benefits is dependent upon 
I.M.B.'s relationship to the wage earner within the meaning of the Social Security Act, 
arguments for Mrs. Bums and I.M.B. in this brief will be referred collectively as one, for 
simplicity. 
Two sections of the Social Security Act are relevant for determining whether 
claimant qualifies as the insured's child for purposes of entitlement to benefits. The 
certified question only envelops 42 U.S.C. 216(H)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act.3 
Under this section, a surviving child is entitled to surviving child's benefits if he could 
inherit from the wage earner's estate under the intestacy laws of the state in which the 
insured was domiciled when he died.4,5 
3The other sections of the Social Security Code are not applicable and not 
addressed in this brief. 
4See 42 U.S.C, §416(H)(2)(A); 20 CFR 404.355(A)(1) determining whether a 
child can inherit an insured wage earner's property the agency commissioner applies the 
version of the state intestacy law that is in effect when the claim is being adjudicated. 
520 CFR §404.355(B)(4), if a child cannot inherit under the version of state law in 
effect at the time of adjudication, then the agency may apply the version of state law that 
was in effect when the insured died, or any version of state law in effect from the date the 
application was filed up until the agency's final decision on the application to determine 
whether a child can inherit a wage earner's property. 
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QUESTIONS FOR THIS COURT 
The question from the Federal District Court is: 
Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in 
the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent' in a record to 
being the 4 parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the 
donor's death under Utah intestacy law, Utah Code Ann, §78B-15-707 
The Federal District Court needs a determination whether I.M.B. would be an 
intestate heir of Michael Bums under the Utah Assisted Reproduction Act, in conjunction 
with the Semen Storage Agreement as signed by Mr. and Mrs. Bums at the University of 
Utah Reproductive Assistance Center. U.C.A. §78B-15-707 states: 
"If spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the 
deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased 
spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur 
after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child. 
Appellants believe that there are two arguments to be made, which will be 
addressed separately: 
(1) Was the Semen Storage Agreement, standing on its own, 
sufficient to determine that Mr. Burns "consented in a record to 
assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7, Assisted < 
Reproduction, which resulted in the birth of the child," U.C. A. §78B-
15-201(2)(e) and, if so, did Mr. Burns consent "in a record that if 
assisted reproduction were to occur after [his] death, [he] would be a 
parent of the child? U.C.A. §786-15-707. 
Appellants believe the Semen Storage Agreement clearly supports this position. 
Argument number two for this court is: 
• < 
10 
4 
(2) If the Semen Storage Agreement was ambiguous or vague in 
determining this question, the court must go outside the document for 
any relevant evidence that supports or disproves that Mr. Burns did or 
did not desire a child created by his cryopreserved semen to be 
considered his natural child and heir even after his death. 
Argument I 
Did Mr. Burns consent in a record signed by him and his wife that he would 
be the resulting father of the child born to his wife under the Utah Assisted 
Reproduction Act even after his death? U.C.A. §788-15-701, et. seq. 
The term "record" is defined under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act as 
"information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or 
other medium, and is retrievable in perceivable form. U.C.A. §78B-15-102. 
Clearly the Semen Storage Agreement from the University of Utah School of 
Medicine, Salt Lake City, Utah, Division of Urology, is a record maintained by the 
University of Utah, a state entity. The letters from the Reproductive Care Center (tr 113), 
University of Utah School of Medicine, Douglas T. Carrell, Associate Professor of 
Surgery (Urology), OB/GYN and Physiology (tr 114) and Debbie Cartmill, M.S., of the 
Andrology Program at the University of Utah (tr 115) are stored in a database at the 
University of Utah and are retrievable records in a medium inscribed upon computers or 
hard copies of Mr. and Mrs. Burns and are available to public or private entities in certain 
limited circumstances, i.e., health insurance, other physicians, attorney/client consent. 
Also, the requests for amendments to the birth certificate of I.M.B. was titled, 
11 
"Affidavit to Amend a Record" (tr 116) and were issued by "Utah Department of Health, 
Office of Vital Records and Statistics." (tr 117-120). These are "records" as 
contemplated and defined under the definitions of "record" under Utah law. U.C.A. 
§78B-15-102(26). 
Finally, the transcripts of the Social Security hearing and the court documents of 
the Third Judicial District Courts should also be considered "records" for this matter. 
Assuming these are sufficient "records," next we must visit the argument of 
whether Mr. Bums "consented in a record" to being the parent of a child conceived by 
artificial means after his death. 
Under the first scenario, we must look at the Semen Storage Agreement standing 
alone to determine whether Mr. Bums knew and desired that a child could be conceived 
and bom and considered his natural child and heir, even after his death using the 
cryopreserved semen. 
Under the Semen Storage Agreement, there were eight reasons that a donor could: 
"have his semen collected, evaluated, frozen and stored for his future use or 
other possible uses as herein set forth. Semen is desired by the donor for 
one or more of the following reasons: (bold not in original) 
A. Prior to vasectomy; 
B. Prior to irradiation and/or chemotherapy; 
C. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications; 
D. Prior to exposure to potentially toxic environmental conditions; 
E. Prior to travel or extended absence of the donor; 
F. Prior to artificial insemination; 
G. Prior to shipment of the semen to another location; 
H. Or other reasons deemed appropriate by my Doctor." (tr 108). 
12 
The contract did not state that any of the choices had to be signed, circled, checked 
or initialed or otherwise indicate why Mr. Burns was having his semen cryopreserved. 
At the time of Mr. Burns' signing this Semen Storage Agreement, he was told by 
his doctor that he had a 95% chance of recovery. However, there was the chance with 
irradiation and chemotherapy that he may be rendered sterile. At the time of signing of 
the Agreement, this was the main reason for the collection of semen for cryopreservation. 
The Semen Storage Agreement then goes on to state, "I understand that it is 
impossible to determine with absolute certainty if my semen will freeze and thaw well 
enough to contribute to a future pregnancy, (tr 109) (bold not in original). 
And Section 3 B reads: 
"The donor understands that the use of frozen-thawed sperm results 
in a much lower chance of pregnancy compared to fresh sperm. It is 
currently estimated that fresh sperm results in a three fold higher chance of 
pregnancy compared to frozen-thawed sperm. Storage of 12-15 vials 
should result in 4-6 months of trying to achieve pregnancy with 
insemination. The donor understands that it is impossible to determine if a 
given individual's semen will be able to result in a pregnancy even under 
ideal conditions." (tr 109) (bold not in original). 
Section M states: 
Donor covenants and agrees, without a reservation of rights, in law 
or equity, to indemnify, hold harmless and release the University and its 
employees and agents...from any and all liability or obligation of any kind 
or manner...connected with said procedures or related thereto...or in any 
manner with, the offspring resulting from the artificial insemination 
utilizing said semen samples and/or procedures connected therewith..." (tr 
110) (bold not in original). 
13 
Of most import, Section I of the Semen Storage Agreement states in no uncertain 
terms: 
"In the event of the death of the donor the donor would like his 
vials of semen (initial one of the items below): 
a. Destroyed ______ 
b. Maintained in storage for future donation to Gayle Burns 
(handwritten) (fill in name and relationship) who will assume 
all of the obligations and terms described in this contract 
MB . (Mr. Bums'initials) (bold not in original) 
Thus, upon his death, Mr. Bums did gift these frozen vials of semen "for future 
donation to [Appellant] Gayle Bums," for whatever uses she may see fit and as described 
in the Contract, which would include "artificial insemination" and/or "contribution to a 
future pregnancy," or creating "offspring resulting from the artificial insemination." This 
contract was then dated and signed by the donor, Michael Bums, and the donor's wife, 
Appellant Gayle Bums, and by a representative of the University of Utah Division of 
Urology on May 30, 2000, as per U.C.A.§78B-15-704. ( t r i l l ) . 
Unfortunately, Mr. Bums' condition then took a turn for the worse, and he passed 
away unexpectedly on March 24, 2001 from Non Hodgkins Lymphoma and ( 
chemotherapy, (tr 112). 
It is Appellants' position that the numerous references to "artificial insemination" 
throughout the Semen Storage Agreement clearly indicate Mr. Bums knew that these 
frozen semen samples could be used to "contribute to a future pregnancy," (tr 108) and 
A 
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create "offspring resulting from the artificial insemination/' (tr 110) and "trying to 
achieve pregnancy with insemination," (tr 109) and "be able to result in a pregnancy." (tr 
109). 
The Agreement specifically refers to "in the event of the death of the donor, the 
donor would like his vials of semen," "maintained in storage for future donation to Gayle 
Burns, who will assume all of the obligations and terms described in this contract." (tr 
109-10). Thus, "the deceased spouse [Mr. Burns] consented in a record that if assisted 
reproduction were to occur after his death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the 
child." UCA§78B-15-707. 
Mr. and Mrs. Bums had only high hopes that Michael would beat this cancer with 
the 95% success rate they were told. However, once the bad news was revealed to them, 
they had no thoughts of the Semen Storage Agreement or future claims with Social 
Security upon their minds. It was the furthest thought from the Burns' minds. 
Under U.C.A §78B-15-201(2) Establishment of Parent-Child Relationship, 
(2) The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child 
by (e) the man having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under 
Part 7, Assisted Reproduction which resulted in the birth of a child. 
The Semen Storage Agreement was signed by both Mr. and Mrs. Burns pursuant to 
§78B-15-704(1) "A consent to assisted reproduction by a married woman must be in a 
record signed by the woman and her husband." 
Mr. Burns provided sperm for, or consented to assisted reproduction by his wife as 
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necessary in §78B-15-704, and Mr. Bums is thus "the father of the resulting child bom to 
his wife [Appellant]." U.C.A. §78B-15-703. 
Argument II 
If the Semen Storage Agreement was vague or ambiguous, the court must look for 
any relevant evidence to determine whether Mr. Bums consented to the future birth of a 
child after his death and have said child recognized as his own child and heir. "Utah law 
does not strictly require courts to only view the terms of a contract within its four comers, 
according to their plain meaning, when making the determination of whether there is an 
ambiguity in a contract." Gilmore v. Macy, 121 P.3rd 57, 2005 Ut.App.351. "When 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. 
Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based • 
solely on the 'extrinsic evidence' of the judge's own linguistic education and experience." 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268, (UT 1995) (citations omitted). 
See also, Nielson v. Gold's Gym. 78 P.3rd 600, 2003 UT 37, para 7, stating that 
"[relevant], extrinsic evidence of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered 
the contract is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the contract is ( 
ambiguous. The judge should therefore consider any credible evidence offered to show 
theparties' intentions." • 
There are numerous references in the record which clearly support that Mr. Bums 
discussed this after-death birth scenario with his wife and his family. It was clearly his 
i 
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desire that Mrs. Burns have their child, even after his death. 
Dr. James Heiner, M.D., of the Reproductive Care Center opined that based upon 
the medical care and records of Appellant that it was "assur[ed] that Michael [Burns] was 
the father." (tr 113). And the Administrative Law Judge at the Social Security level and 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn determined that Appellant was not seeing anyone else, having 
sexual relationships with anyone else, nor was there any other possible male party who 
could have inseminated Ms. Burns a year prior to I.M.B.'s birth, (tr 171 para. 13, and 
230). 
Q (by Social Security ALJ) To the best of your recollection, at the 
time that this semen sample was taken, had you or he discussed the 
possibility that he would not survive the chemo and radiation, that he would 
die and whether or not he wanted to leave you with a child that he was not 
going to be able to support? 
A (by Ms. Burns) We hadn't discussed it until we actually signed 
this agreement where he had to notate what happened what happened [sic] 
if he did die, what he wanted. And before we signed the agreement we 
went home that night and had a discussion about if he did pass away he 
wanted the sperm to go to me so that a piece of him would be be - - a piece 
of him and I would be on the earth. He wanted me to have his kids. 
Q So you did not sign that immediately when they presented you 
with that option? 
A No, we didn't. 
Q Were you there with him when it was first presented to him, that 
question? 
A I was, yes. 
Q And the two of you wanted to go home and talk about it? 
17 
A We did. Because of his survival rate, the 95 percent we hadn't 
really even considered him not surviving, so that's the matter of discussion 
that night. 
Q And he decided he wanted a piece of him - - see, there are two 
competing interests here, a piece of me going on or he's saddling you with a 
burden that I can't help you support, two competing interests going on here 
A Right. 
Q - - that needed to be resolved. And he resolved that to the best 
of your recollection here, and I know you're not a disinterested party here. 
A Right. 
Q To this conversation. To the best of your recollection he said 
that he wanted a piece of him to go on even if he should die before the child 
was conceived? 
A He did. He wanted a child of his on the earth. 
Q The next day he signed that? 
A He did. The next day he went in to do the deposit, 
(tr 232-233). 
Q (By attorney Hadley) And Ian [sic] [Michael] signed this on May 
30, 2000 and he passed away on March 24, 2001. When did he actually get 
worse where he started discussing this? 
i 
A (By Ms. Burns) He went through two rounds of chemo and we 
had to go through a bone marrow transplant and at that point his chances 
were 50/50 and we had to discuss more of what was going to happen if he 
passed away. 
Q When approximately was that? 
A That was, let's see, he went for bone marrow of 2000, December 
of 2000, toward the end. < 
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Q Did either of you think about going back and looking at this 
contract and making any changes on it that would indicate that the saved 
sperm would be being used for artificial insemination? 
A I don't think we thought about the agreement at that time 
because it was quite a trying time for us. I think what we as lay people had 
thought of as the agreement was that it would have taken care of it because 
we didn't see any reason not to think it would. 
Q So it was you and Michael's understanding that if he passed 
away the contract that you'd signed seven months before gave you the right 
to use that semen to impregnate yourself? 
A It was my understanding, yes, and Michael's. 
(tr236). 
Further, Elizabeth Park, the sister of the deceased and special administrator of his 
estate, states that herself and Michael's three brothers recognize I.M.B. as their nephew, 
and all of their children recognize him as their cousin, and Grandma and Grandpa Bums 
recognized I.M.B. as their grandchild, (tr 172 para. 14 and 173 para. 7). 
Further, Ms. Park states on the Social Security record that she discussed this with 
her brother Michael, stating: 
Q (By Attorney Hadley) Prior to your brother's death, did you ever 
happen to have any conversations with him about this semen storage he had 
with his wife? 
A (Ms. Park) Yes, I did. 
Q What was said? 
A Well, he let me know that they were going to be storing his 
semen and at that point it was for when he recovered. And we also talked 
about if he happened to not recover what he would do and he talked about 
having Gayle have his child after he died. 
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Q He wanted Gayle to have his child if he did not survive the 
treatment and cancer? 
A Yes, he did. 
(tr242). 
Finally, Ms. Park was appointed special administrator of the estate of Michael 
Burns on or about February 15, 2008 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Case No. 083900243. (tr 172 and Addendum). Said petition 
was an Informal Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination of Heirs and 
Appointment of Special Administrator. Ms. Park was appointed Special Administrator 
(not in transcript but in Appellants' Addendum and supplied to Appellee's attorneys). 
There was a finding that Mr. Bums died without a will and that Gayle Bums and I.M.B. 
were his heirs. 
. i 
Ms. Bums then filed a petition for determination of paternity In the Matter of 
I.M.B. (DOB 12/23/03), a minor child, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Case Number 074904953 before the Honorable Judge 
Anthony B. Quinn. A hearing was scheduled for Tuesday, February 5, 2008 at 8:30 a.m. 
Notice of the hearing and a certificate of mailing was accepted by Gayle Bums and ( 
Elizabeth Park and mailed postage prepaid to the Social Security Administration, the 
Honorable Donald R. Jensen (the Social Security Administrative Law Judge) and the 
Utah Attorney General's office. In the Findings of Fact drafted after the hearing by this 
counsel, it was found: 
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"5. That in personal conversations with his wife, Gayle Bums, 
Michael A. Bums did express his desire to use his stored semen to have a 
child in the future by artificial means if he was rendered sterile by the 
treatments" (tr 151). 
Under Conclusions of Law, it stated: 
"5. That the contract entered into by Michael A. Bums and the 
University of Utah did give care, custody and control of the semen to Gayle 
Bums for such fertilization purposes in the event of the death of Michael A. 
Bums. 
6. That Michael A. Bums did discuss and intend for Gayle 
Bums to use this semen for in vitro fertilization and such was discussed 
between and agreed to by Gayle Bums and Michael A. Bums. 
7. That the minor child, [I.M.B.], has been recognized by 
Michael A. Bums' family as the son of Michael A. Bums in all respects and 
is openly acknowledged and recognized as the natural son of Michael A. 
Bums. 
8. That petitioner has met their burden of proof. (Clear and 
convincing, U.C.A. §78B-15-112.) 
9. That an appropriate Order consistent with these Findings 
indicating the paternity and all rights arising therefrom of [I.M.B.] by 
Michael A. Bums should be issued." 
(tr 154). 
An Order consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was signed 
by Judge Quinn on April 15, 2008, stating: 
"It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Michael 
A. Bums, deceased, is the natural father of [I.M.B.], subject child of this 
matter, bom on December 23,2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah to his natural 
mother Gayle M. Bums. 
That all rights arising from said parent/child relationship 
including those of care, custody, support and inheritance are hereby 
21 
granted for the benefit of [I.M.B.] a minor." (tr 155-156). (Bold not in 
original.) 
Thus, even if this court finds the Semen Storage Agreement vague or ambiguous, 
there is enough extrinsic evidence including a Utah tribunal which supports the fact that 
Mr. Bums contemplated, discussed and wished that a child being bom by artificial means 
even after his death would be his own natural child and heir. 
The Appellees have argued at the administrative level that the marriage terminated 
upon the death of Mr. Bums and thus Appellants do not qualify for Social Security Rules. 
However, U.C.A §78B-15-202 states: 
"No Discrimination Based on Marital Status: A child bom to 
parents who are not married to each other whose paternity has been 
determined under this chapter has the same rights under the law as a child 
bom to parents who are married to each other." 
UTAH INTESTACY LAW 
In the Bums' scenario an heir or interested person would file an Application for 
Finding of Intestacy, Informal or Formal Appointment of Personal Representative or 
Special Administrator, and Determination of Heirs. The appropriate person would sign 
these documents under oath, submit it to the court, stating that the deceased died on 
certain date in the state of Utah, in the appropriate county, that the deceased died intestate 
(without a will or no known wills) and heirs and interested persons are listed with their 
address and their relationship to the deceased, i.e., spouse, child, sister/daughter, and age. 
This would be submitted to the registrar of the court. Appropriate Findings would be 
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submitted to the registrar/clerk/judge of the court for their signature, and Findings would 
be made stating that the application is appropriate in all respects, and that the heirs or 
interested parties would receive notice of the hearing or waive such, and a personal 
representative/special administrator would be appointed. A sample of such forms are 
included in the Addendum.6 
If there were questions about the rights of I.M.B. as a natural child, a birth 
certificate listing his natural father could be submitted to the court. In addition, further 
evidence to prove I.M.B. as an heir of Mr. Burns would be the Order of Judge Anthony 
Quinn that I.M.B. is the child and heir of the deceased. This Order alone is enough of a 
record to support the fact that Utah courts have recognized I.M.B. as the natural child and 
an heir of the deceased Michael Bums, for intestacy purposes. 
Under U.C.A. §78B-15-203, Consequences of Establishment of Parentage: 
Unless parental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship established 
under this chapter applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically 
provided by other law of this state. 
Mr. Burns' parental rights were never terminated over I.M.B. Thus, the Order 
from Judge Quinn: "That all rights arising from said parent/child relationship, including 
those of care, custody, support and inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of 
I.M.B., a minor, (bold not in original) is controlling on heirship of I.M.B. 
6There are other intestate inheritance laws involving half children, grandparents, 
cousins, brothers, sisters, etc., which are irrelevant to these arguments and are not 
addressed in this brief. 
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And under U.C.A. §75-2-103, Share of Heirs Other than the Surviving Spouse: 
(1) Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving 
spouse under Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no 
surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals designated 
below who survive the decedent. 
(a) to the decedent's descendants per capita at each generation as 
defined in Subsection 75-2-106(2). 
The "decedent's descendant" would be I.M.B. if Mrs. Burns predeceased I.M.B. 
Uniform Probate Code 75-2-106. Definitions-Per capita to each 
generation-Terms in Governing Instruments. 
(1) As used in this section ^ 
(b) "Surviving descendent" means a descendant who neither 
predeceased the decedent nor is considered to have predeceased the 
decedent under 75-2-104. 
And U.C.A. §75-2-104, Requirement that heir survive decedent for 120 hours. 
An individual who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is 
considered to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead < 
allowance, exempt property, and intestate succession, and the decedent's 
heirs are determined accordingly. It is not established by clear and 
convincing evidence that an individual who would otherwise be an heir 
survived the decedent by 120 hours, it is considered that the individual 
failed to survive for the required period. This section is not to be applied if ( 
its application would result in a taking of the intestate estate by the state 
under Section 75-2-105. 
U.C.A. §75-2-104 is generally used for simultaneous deaths if a common accident
 { 
killed several members of the same family and they die within a few days of each other. 
There are special situations where family members will die within five days of each other 
< 
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and inheritance rights of heirs may be affected by this statute. This code section would 
apply to such matters as homestead allowance and exempt property and distributive 
provisions in certain types of trusts. 
However, the next statute that comes into play is U.C.A. §75-2-108, Afterborn 
heirs. 
"An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that 
time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth. 
There is no Utah law regarding this matter. Nor is there any Utah definition of the 
term "at a particular time." "At a particular time" can be interpreted in two ways. 
First, the Utah legislature could have stated more specifically the clause to read: 
"An individual in gestation [at the time of death of the deceased] is treated 
as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth." 
The legislature did not opt for such a particular and limiting clause. 
As such, "at a particular time" could refer to time in the past or future and has no 
specific spatial or time references and is a general and open term. There is no other 
language in the Utah Probate Code or the Utah Code that states that it is required that a 
posthumous child be in utero before the death of the deceased to be considered for a 
particular title or right, i.e., heir or beneficiary of an estate, a trust, or life insurance 
policy. 
One scenario that could apply using U.C.A. §75-2-105 is that I.M.B. would be 
entitled to a million-dollar distribution from a trust upon his birth. Should I.M.B. not live 
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for five days after his birth, I.M.B. (or his heirs) would not be entitled to this million-
dollar share of the trust, and such distribution would revert back to the trust. 
This idea of a posthumous-born child is also addressed in the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act, U.C.A. 34A-2-403(l), which states: 
"The following person shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for 
support upon a deceased employee: 
A. A child under 18 years of age; 
(3) as used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act that the child includes (i) posthumous child. 
Again, there is no requirement under this worker's compensation code that the child be in 
utero at the time of death of the wage earner. 
In a similar vein, U.C.A. §78B-15-702, Parental Status of a Donor states: 
"A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted 
reproduction." 
The purpose of this statute is to deny a non-spousal egg or sperm donor in a 
Gestational Agreement (see U.C.A. §78B-15-801, et seq.) the parental rights of 
inheritance, earnings and comfort of a child, and also eliminates that donor's duties of 
support and care over said child. By reverse logic, these rights and duties and inheritance, 
support and care of a natural child are strictly applied to an egg or a sperm donor who are 
the natural father and mother of the child. 
And referring to the Utah Rules of Construction under U.C.A. §68-3-2: 
"The statutes establishing the laws of this state respecting the subject to 
which they relate, and their provisions in all proceedings under them are to 
be liberally construed with a view to affect the objects of the statutes and to 
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promote justice." 
The Utah Legislature has made provisions for after-bom children who are bom as 
a result of assisted reproduction, and they have established such procedures in the Utah 
Uniform Parentage Act and such statutes should be liberally construed in their 
interpretation to protect the minor and their right to have a natural parent and have rights 
of inheritance. 
Further, to deny I.M.B. his surviving child's benefits is a violation of due process 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution Art. XIV Sec. 1. The 
method of conception through artificial insemination has created a whole new class of 
children. This class of children should not be deprived of certain rights because they 
were not conceived and bom in the "normal" or "accepted" manner of sexual intercourse. 
XI 
SUMMATION OF ARGUMENT 
Medical technology has changed drastically over the years. It was inconceivable 
when the Utah Uniform Probate Code was drawn up that there would be methods to 
cryopreserve semen and eggs to create an embryo for implantation in a woman. Even 
now, couples can create an embryo from their own semen and eggs and have another 
woman carry and give birth to their natural children in gestational agreements. 
Such scientific breakthroughs were only considered in the near past as science 
fiction. Today such technology includes computers, e-mail and instant texting by cell 
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phones. Such technology and the laws associated with these technologies are constantly 
being addressed by courts and legislatures. Cyber bullying and sexting are just two 
simple examples of our changing society that were not considered 10 years ago but are 
now considered criminal acts. 
Our legislature has seen fit to address the Bums' situation through the Utah 
Uniform Parentage Act. Michael Bums, in the Semen Storage Agreement, agreed that in 
the event of his death, his wife Gayle Bums would be the beneficiary of his frozen semen 
to do with as she pleased, as per the terms of the Agreement. This included a future 
pregnancy with offspring resulting from the artificial insemination. Mr. Bums, by his 
signing the Semen Storage Agreement with his wife, did establish rights for any children 
bom even at a later date, even after his death by the signing of this Agreement with his 
wife. Further, if there is any question as to his intent, there is extrinsic evidence outside 
the contract indicating that all of Mr. Bums' family have accepted I.M.B. as their cousin, 
' i 
niece and grandchild, and that specifically Michael Bums wished for he and his wife, 
Gayle, to have a "child of his own on this earth." 
Finally, Judge Anthony A. Quinn did make a finding of paternity that Michael A. { 
Bums was the natural father of I.M.B., and that I.M.B. was granted "all rights arising 
from said parent/child relationship including those of care, custody, support and 
inheritance...for the benefit of I.M.B., a minor." 
The intent of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act has achieved its goal in this matter 
i 
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{ 
and this court should find that Michael A. Burns is the natural father of I.M.B., and that 
I.M.B. has rights of inheritance under intestacy laws of the state of Utah and is a natural 
dependent and heir of Michael A. Burns. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this & day of May, 2011. 
•rf , ' ' SJ 
- ^ 
'^^7?/// >4^ 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Ap 
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§^8B-15-623 JUDICIAL CODE 
raised and the tribunal adjudicates according to Part 6, Adjudication of Parent-
?e, and the final order: •$*• 
a) expressly identifies a child as a "child of the marriage," "issue of the 
mam^ge," or similar words indicating that the husband is the father of the 
child; 
(b) p r o v e s for support of the child by the husband unless paternity is 
specifically cradaimed in the order. /f:' 
..(4) The tribunal is not considered to have mptde-an adjudication of the 
parentage of a child irSta child was born at the-lime of entry of the order and 
other children are nam&d^as children of^the marriage, but that child is 
specifically not named. 
(5) Once the paternity of a chilcfha&been adjudicated, an individual who was 
not a party to the paternity p r o c e ^ n ^ m a y not challenge the paternity, unless: 
(a) the party seeking to#d&allengeS^an demonstrate a fraud upon the 
tribunal; J*' 
(b) the challenger rail demonstrate by cle&rand convincing evidence that 
the challenger did^ffot know about the adjudicatory proceeding or did not 
have a reasonable*opportunity to know of the proceeding; and 
(c) there wmild be harm to the child to leave the oro^r in place. 
{6) A pa0y to an adjudication of paternity may challenge the adjudication 
only unjj^r law of this state relating to appeal, vacation of ju&gpients, or other 
judid^Q review. 
l^ds 2008, c. 3, § 1443^  eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 637 of the Uniform Laws 2005, c. 150, § 81. 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
 n 1 Q C 7 fi ' ' .,. ' -
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- u l*bi> * ™-45g-o2,3. 
base on Westlaw. 
Children Out-of-Wedlock <3=>64. 
Westlaw Topic No. 76H. 
Xibrary References 
CJ.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock §§ 121 to 
122. 
PART 7. ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 
. Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Caveat vendor:, Potential progeny, paternity, 
and product liability. Dawn R. Swink, J. Brad 
Reich, 2007 BYULR 857. 
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mm UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §78B-15-703 
§788-15-701. Scope f 
This part does not apply to the birth of a child conceived by means of sexual 
intercourse, or as result of a gestational agreement as provided in Part 8, 
Gestational Agreement. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1444, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 701 of the Uniform Laws 2005 c 150 § 82 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
 K ' ' ' ' 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- u l^6' 9 /«-4ig- /ul . 
base on Westlaw. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity, and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 857 
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink (2007). 
§ 7 8 B - 1 5 - 7 0 2 . Parental status of donor 
A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduc-
tion. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1445, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 702 of the Uniform Laws 2005 c 150 § 83 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
 1 Q-- R ' ' , - ' 7 n o ' 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- L- 1 9 5 3 ' s '»-45g-702. 
base on Westlaw. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity, and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 857 
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink (2007). 
§ 78B—15—703. Husband's paternity of child of assisted reproduction 
If a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by his 
wife as provided in Section 78B-15-704, he is the father of a resulting child 
born to his wife. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1446, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 703 of the Uniform Laws 2005 c 150 § 8 4 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform ,n i Q_- fi-L0' „c ' n^ ' 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- u l^6' 9 78-45g-/0J. 
base on Westlaw. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity, and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 857 
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink (2007). 
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UTAH UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §788-15-707 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 705 of the Uniform Laws 2005, c. 150; § 86. 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
 r ^ s 7Q_AQ« ink 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- u i y V ' 8 /S-^g-/u:>. .... 
base on Westlaw. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity, and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U..L. Rev. 857 
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink (2007). 
Library References 
Children Out-of-Wedlock<3»15. $ 
Westlaw Topic No. 76H. 
§ 7 8 B - 1 5 - 7 0 6 . Effect of dissolution of marriage 
(1) If a marriage is dissolved .before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, 
the former spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse 
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after a 
divorce, the former spousevvotdd be a parentof the child. 
(2) The consent of the foriner spouse to assisted reproduction may be 
revoked by that individual in a record at any time before placement of eggs, 
sperm, or embryos. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1449, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law PriorLaws: 
This section is similar to § 706 of the Uniform Laws 2005, c. 150, § 87." 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
 h 1QI-7 A '''-,£ AC ™A 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- u iy!>.^.?"•-. • _ :>g" /• " 
base on Westlaw. , 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity, and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 857 
and product liability online. Dawn fe. Swink (2007). 
Library References 
Children Out-of-Wedlock <3>15. 
Westlaw Topic No. 76H. 
§ 7 8 B - 1 5 - 7 0 7 . Parental status of deceased spouse 
If a spouse dies before placement bf eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased 
spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse 
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, 
the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1450, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
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§ ( 1 8 B - 1 5 - 7 0 7 JUDICIAL COI 
Historical; and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 707 of the Uniform 1
 flWo 2005 r 15fr- 6 ft* 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform r T J « V 7 ^ f ' JnJ 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- c - i y 5 3 ' $ 78-45g-707.v 
base on Westlaw. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Caveat vendor: Potential progeny, paternity, and J. Brad Reich, 2007 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 85 
and product liability online. Dawn R. Swink (2007). 
Library References 
Children Out-of-Wedlock <3»15. 
Westlaw Topic No. 76H. 
/ 
PART 8. GESTATIONAL AGREEMENT s / 
7 8 B - 1 5 - 8 0 1 . Gestational agreement authorized / 
\jF%A prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married, a donor 
or theaqnors,, and the intended parents may enter into a written agreement 
providing th^tt: 
(a) the prospective gestational mother agrees to pregnancy by means of 
assisted reprodubtion; 
(b) the prospective, gestational mother, her husband if she is married, and 
the donors relinquish Ml rights a^ the parents of a child conceived 
through assisted reprpd^tion; and -
(c) the intended parents ^ ecome thfe parents of the child. 
(2) The intended gestational Mother may not currently be receiving Medicaid 
or any other state assistance!; j ^ "' 
(3) The intended parents shall be itiarried, and both spouses must be parties 
to the gestational agreement,/' V 
(4) A gestational agreement is' enforceable only if validated as provided in 
Section 78B-15-803. / N v 
• • : • • • • ' •)?' \ * 
(5) A gestational agreement does not apply to the^ birth of a child conceived 
by means of sexual intercourseor if neither i n t ^ ^ d paj?e^ is; a donor. 
(6) The partie|/tq a gestatipnal agreement sh^ll ^ 
(7) The gestational mother's eggs may not be used in^the^^dsted reproduc-
tion procedure. ^••.•.i->;v,,.---^^' 
(S) If the gestational mother is married, her hiisbaiict's sperm may not be 
used in tlie assisted reproduction procedure; 
Laws # 0 8 , e. 3 , § 1451, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
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Library References 
Children Out-of-Wedlock <3»20.2, 20.9. 
Westlaw Topic No. 76H. 
* C;j.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock §§ 37 to 38. jir 
Social Security number in tribunal records 
The Social Security number of any individual who is subject to a paternity 
determination shall be placed in the records relating-to the matter. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1381, eff. Feb. 7/20.08. 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1997, c. 232, § 79. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
..,*'" Laws 2005, c. 150, § ,19. 
f'' . . & 1953^§§ 78-45a-11.5,78-45g-114. 
§ 7 8 B - 1 5 - 1 1 5 . Settlement agreements 
*** An agreement pJKsettlement with the alleged father is binding only when 
approved by the^fribunaL 
Laws 2008,JB^, § 1382, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. ^ * 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
6r Laws: Laws 2005, c. 150, § 20. 
Laws 1965, c. 158, § 13. C. 1953, §§ 78-45a-13, 78-45g-115. 
PART 2. PARENT AND CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
§ 7 8 B - 1 5 - 2 0 1 . Establishment of parent-child relationship 
(1) The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and a 
child by: 
(a) the woman's having given birth to the child, except as otherwise 
provided in Part 8, Gestational Agreement; 
(b) an adjudication of the woman's maternity; 
(c) adoption of the child by the woman; or -
(d) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a 
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under Part 8, Gestational 
Agreement, pris enforceable under other law. 
(2) The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by: 
(a) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity of the child under 
Section 78B-15-204; 
•(b) an effective declaration of piaternity by the man under Part 3, Voluntary 
Declaration of Paternity, unless the declaration has been rescinded or suc-
cessfully challenged; 
(c) an adjudication pf the man's paternity; 
(d) adoption of the child by the man; 
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(e) the man having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under 
Part 7, Assisted Reproduction, which resulted in the birth of the child; or 
(f) an adjudication confirming the man as a parent of a child born to a 
gestational mother if the agreement was validated under Part 8, Gestational 
Agreement, or is enforceable under other law. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1383, eff. Feb. 7,2008. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to §201 of the Uniform Laws 2005, c 156, § 2 1 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
 n 1 f l „ <* '_Q' .- ' o m . • 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- U l ^ J , S /8-4^g-2Ul. 
base on Wesdaw. 
: .: •••: . • :.y . . - . . . . / • • , - . - , : . . ^ / . : ; V , ... .. .; -^ y:-- -. 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 1 tional test that could be easily and uniformly 
• .. ,..,•;. •;,.— ..-..•.. applied in all cases, adopting doctrine would 
1 In general not be a natural development of the common 
'Supreme Court would decline to adopt a de l a w feut r * h e r : * legisktive act in derogation of 
facto parent or psychological parent doctrine to recognized common law principles and doc 
allow former domestic partner to seek visitation trine conflicted with state statutory law. Jones 
with child who was born to other partner dur- v. Barlow, 2007, 154 P.3d 808, 571 Utah Adv. 
ing parties' relationship; a de facto parent doc- Rep. 20, 2007 UT 20. Children Out-of-wedlock 
trine would not provide an identifiable jurisdic- <§=* 20.9 
§ 7 8 B - 1 5 - 2 0 2 . No discrimination based on marital status 
A child born to parents who are not married to each other whose paternity 
has been determined under this chapter has the same rights under the law as a 
child born to parents who are married to each other. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1384, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 202 of the Uniform Laws 2005, c. 150, § 22. 
Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B, Uniform
 n 1 Q t . , s ' .- nrn 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Data- u l*:>.*, s/«-4Sg-^u<>. 
base on Westlaw. 
§ 78B—15—203. Consequences of establishment of parentage 
Unless parental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship established 
under this chapter applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically 
provided by other law of this state. 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1385; efL Feb. 7, 2008. ' ^ - 1 1 
Historical and Statutory Notes ^^  
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is identical to § 203 of the Uni- Laws 2005, c. 150, § 23. 
form Parentage Act (2000). See Volume 9B,
 r 1Q_- ~ ' fi .- ' 0 A 7 
Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or i~ i*w, 9 /s-4!>g-zuj. 
ULA Database on Westlaw. 
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Rule 41 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE CERHFICATK 
TITLE VI. CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER 
BETWEEN COURTS 
RULE 41 . CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW BY UNITED 
STATES COURTS 
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court may 
answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States 
when requested to do so by such certifying court acting in accordance with the 
provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding 
before the certifying court is uncertain. 
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court of the United States may invoke this rule 
by entering an order of certification as described in this rule. When invoking 
this rule, the certifying court may act either sua sponte or upon a motion by any 
party. 
(c) Certification order. 
(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme Court and 
shall state: 
(c)(1)(A) the question of law to be answered; 
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in a proceed-
ing pending before the certifying court; and 
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law. 
(c)(2) The order shall also set forth all8 facts which are relevant to the 
determination of the question certified and which show the nature of the 
controversy, the context in which the questioii arose, and the procedural steps 
by which the question was framed. 
(c)(3) The certifying court may also include in the order any additional 
reasons for its entry of the certification order that are not otherwise apparent. 
(d) Form of certification order; submission of record. A certification order 
shall be signed by the judge presiding over the proceeding giving rise to the 
certification order and forwarded to the; Utah Supreme Court by the clerk of 
the certifying coirrt under its official seal. The Supreme Court may require that 
all or any portion of the record before the certifying court be filed with the 
Supreme Court if the record or a portion thereof may be necessary in determin-
ing whether to accept the certified question or in answering that question. A 
copy of the record certified by the cl^rk of the certifying court to conform to the 
original may be substituted for the original as the record. 
(e) Acceptance or rejection of certification. Upon filing of the certification 
order and accompanying papers with the clerk, the Supreme Court shall 
promptly enter an order either accepting or rejecting the question certified to it, 
and the clerk shall serve copies of the order upon the certifying court and all 
parties identified in the certification order. If the Supreme Court accepts the 
question, the Court will set out in the order of acceptance (1) the specific 
question or questions accepted, (2) the deadline for notifying the Supreme 
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INTESTATE SUCCESSION & WILLS § 75-2-102 
In re Jones' Estate, 1940, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 
210. Taxation <S=> 856.1 
Where claims against an intestate's estate 
were never presented by creditors in probate 
proceedings, administratrix did not, by paying 
such claims, divest title to intestate's property 
from intestate's heir, and hence transfer of 
property to heir was subject to an inheritance 
tax. Rev.St.1933, §§ 80-12-8, 101-4-2, 102-9-1, 
102-9-2, 102-9-4. In re Jones' Estate, 1940, 99 
Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210. Taxation ©=> 878(1) 
§ 75-2^-102. Intestate share of spouse 
(1) The intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is: 
(a) the entire intestate estate if: 
(i) no descendant of the decedent survives the decedent; or 
(ii) all of the decedent's surviving descendants are also descendants of 
the surviving spouse; yjr.tfOQ 
(b) the first $56T660, plus l/z of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or 
more of the decedent's surviving descendants are not descendants of the 
surviving spouse. 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (l)(b), if the intestate estate passes to both the 
decedent's surviving spouse and to other heirs, then any nonprobate transfer, as 
defined in Section 75-2-206, received by the surviving spouse is chargeable 
against the intestate share of the surviving spouse. 
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 11, eff. July 1, 1998, 
Purpose and Scope of Revisions. 
section is revised to give the surviving 
spouse a larger share than the pre-1990 
UPC. If the decedent leaves no surviving 
descendants and no surviving parent or if 
the decedent does leave surviving descen-
dants but neither the decedent nor the 
surviving spouse has other descendants, 
the surviving spouse is entitled to all of the 
decedent's intestate estate. 
If the decedent leaves no surviving de-
scendants but does leave a surviving par-
ent, the decedent's surviving spouse re-
ceives the first $200,000 plus three-fourths 
of the balance of the intestate estate. 
If the decedent leaves surviving descen-
dants and if the surviving spouse (but not 
the decedent) has other descendants, and 
thus the decedent's descendants are un-
likely to be the exclusive beneficiaries of 
the surviving spouse's estate, the surviving 
spouse receives the first $ 150,000 plus 
one-half of the balance of the intestate 
estate. The purpose is to assure the dece-
Itlent's own descendants of a share in the 
Uniform Law Comments 
[UPC § 2-102] 
This decedent's intestate estate when the estate 
exceeds $150,000. 
If the decedent has other descendants, 
the surviving spouse receives $100,000 
plus one-half of the balance. In this type 
of case, the decedent's descendants who 
are not descendants of the surviving 
spouse are not natural objects of the boun-
ty of the surviving spouse. 
Note that in all the cases where the 
surviving spouse receives a lump sum plus 
a fraction of the balance, the lump sums 
must be understood to be in addition to 
the probate exemptions and allowances to 
which the surviving spouse is entitled un-
der Part 4. These can add up to a mini-
mum of $43,000. 
Under the pre-1900 Code, the decedent's 
surviving spouse received the entire intes-
tate estate only if there were neither sur-
viving descendants nor parents. If there 
were surviving descendants, the descen-
dants to one-half of the balance of the 
estate in excess of $50,000 (for example, 
$25,000 in a $100,000 estate). If there 
43 
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were no surviving descendants, but there 
was a surviving parent or parents, the 
parent or parents took that one-half of the 
balance in excess of $50,000. 
References. The theory of this section is 
discussed in Waggoner, "The Multiple-
Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Un-
der the Revised Uniform Probate Code," 
76 Iowa L.Rev. 223, 2:29-35 (1991). 
Empirical studies support the increase 
in the surviving spouse's intestate share, 
reflected in the revisions of this section. 
The studies have shown that testators in 
smaller estates (which intestate estates 
overwhelmingly tend to be) tend to devise 
their entire estates to their surviving spous-
es, even when the couple has children. 
See C. Shammas, M. Salmon & M. Bahlin, 
Inheritance in America from Colonial 
Times to the Present 184-85 (J987); M. 
Sussman, J. Cates & D. Smith, The Family 
and Inheritance (1970); Browder, "Recent 
Patterns of Testate Succession in the Unit-
ed States and England/ ' 67 Mich. L. Rev. 
1303, 1307-08 (1969); Dunham, "The 
Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth 
Transmission at Death," 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
241, 252 (1963); Gibson, "Inheritance of 
Community Property in Texas—A Need for 
Reform," 47 Texas L. Rev. 359, 364-66 
(1969); Price, "The Transmission of 
Wealth at Death in a Community Property 
Jurisdiction," 50 Wash. L. Rev. 277, 283, 
311-17 (1975). See also Fellows, Simon 
& Rau, "Public Attitudes About Property 
Distribution at Death and Intestate Suc-
cession Laws in the United States," 1978 
Am. B. F. Research J. 319, 355-68; Note, 
"A Comparison of Iowans ' Dispositive 
Preferences with selected Provisions of the 
Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes," 63 
Iowa L. Rev. 104i, 1091-92 (1978). 
Cross Reference. See Section 2-802 for 
the definition of spouse, which controls for 
purposes of intestate succession. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law 
This section is similar to § 2-102 of the Uni-
form Probate Code (1990 Revision). See Volume 
8, Pts. I, II, Uniform Laws Annotated, Master 
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1988, c. 110. 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the 
Nontraditional Family, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 93 
(1996). 
Descent and Distribution ^»52, 54. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 
124k54. 
Library References 
CJ.S. Descent and Distribution §§ 60, 63. 
124k52; 
Research References 
Encyclopedias Treatises and Practice Aids 
14 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 755, Transfer of Restatement (Third) Property (Wills & Don. 
Assets in Fraud of Spouse's Antenuptial Trans.) § 2.2, Intestate Share of Surviving 
Contractual Rights. Spouse. ^ ~~ 
Constructive trusts 2 
Conveyances antecedent to marriage 5 
Death during pending divorce proceedings 
Invalid divorce decrees 6 
Nature of right 1 
Partition actions 9 
Notes of Decisions 
Plural wives 3 
Postnuptial agreements 
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Spouse omitted from will 4 
1. Nature of right 
Widow, electing to take her statutory one-
third interest in husband's realty, takes not as 
heir but in her own right. Staats v. Staats, 
1924, 63 Utah 470, 226 P. 677. Descent And 
Distribution @» 52(2) 
2. Constructive trusts 
Wife would be entitled to have constructive 
trust imposed upon four gifts that intestate hus-
band made to other relatives prior to his death, 
if those gifts amounted to a substantial portion 
of his property so as to violate husband's prom-
ise in postnuptial agreement to leave his estate 
to his wife. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-101, 75-2-102. 
Peirce v. Peirce, 2000, 994 P.2d 193, 386 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 38, 2000 UT 7. Trusts <®=» 103(3) 
3. Plural wives 
A plural wife does not acquire the status of a 
lawful wife, and is without the pale of the law of 
inheritance as to any property which her hus-
band has acquired previous to her marriage or 
which he may thereafter acquire. Raleigh v. 
Wells, 1905, 29 Utah 217, 81 P. 908, 110 Am.St. 
Rep. 689. Descent And Distribution <S» 52(2) 
4. Spouse omitted from will 
Widow's intestate share as omitted spouse 
under will executed by decedent during first 
marriage was one half of decedent's estate. 
U.C.A.1953, 75-2^-102(d). Matter of Estate of 
Wagley, 1988, 760 P.2d 316. Descent And Dis-
tribution <3» 52(2) 
5. Conveyances antecedent to marriage 
Conveyance of property to trustee prior to 
marriage operated to transfer property out of 
settlor's estate so as to preclude property from 
becoming part of estate at any time during 
marriage even though settlor reserved right to 
amend or to revoke trust. Horn v. First Sec. 
Bank of Utah, N. A, 1976, 548 P.2d 1265. 
Trusts <s=> 59(3) 
6. Invalid divorce decrees 
Utah statute regarding divorce decrees "not 
recognized as valid in state," which purported 
to prevent party who obtains or consents to 
such a decree from claiming status of other 
party's spouse following his or her death, ap-
plied only to invalid divorce decrees obtained 
while other spouse was alive, not to divorce 
decrees which were void ab initio because of 
other party's intervening death; statute could 
not be applied to prevent wife whose husband 
died during pendency of default divorce pro-
ceeding from inheriting from husband's estate. 
U.C.A.1953, 75-2-803(2)(a). Farrell v. Porter, 
1992, 830 P.2d 299. Descent And Distribution 
«> 52(1); Divorced 169 
7. Death during pending divorce proceedings 
Where wife instituted action for divorce, ob-
tained an interlocutory decree which was to 
become final in three months and which award-
ed her home owned jointly by parties, and died 
midway of three-month period, wife's executrix 
could not be made the grantee. U.C.A.1953, 
74-1-36; 74--4-2. Daly v. Daly, 1975, 533 P.2d 
884. Divorce <3» 83 
When death of one or both parties occurs 
after entry of a divorce decree and before the 
decree is final, the decree, including any deter-
mination of property rights^ becomes ineffective 
and is deemed to be of no further force or 
effect. Daly v. Daly, 1975, 533 P.2d 884. di-
vorce <&* 83 
Where wife, who instituted action for divorce 
and obtained an interlocutory decree to become 
final in three months, died midway of the three-
month period, it was improper to substitute 
wife's executrix as party plaintiff. Daly v. Daly, 
1975, 533 P.2d 884. Parties <S> 59(3) 
8. Postnuptial agreements 
Postnuptial agreement under which wife 
agreed to give intestate husband all her future 
paychecks in return for husband's promise to 
leave his estate to her at his death, contained 
implied restriction on husband's ability to give 
away substantial portions of his estate during 
his lifetime; otherwise, husband would essen-
tially have given no consideration, and his 
promise to leave estate to wife would be illuso-
ry. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-101, 75-2-102. Peirce v. 
Peirce, 2000, 994 P2d 193, 386 Utah Adv; Rep. 
38, 2000 UT 7. Husband And Wife; ®=» 30 
9. Partition actions 
Report of commissioner in partition and de-
cree held to award title in fee to certain real 
estate to the widow, by agreement, in place of 
her life estate in an undivided quarter of all 
decedent's lands under Comp. Laws 1876, 
§ 703. Shaw v. Hays, 1915, 47 Utah 14, 151 P. 
337. Dower And Curtesy <3=> 96 
§ 75-2—103. Share of heirs other than surviving spouse 
(1) Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving 
spouse under Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no 
surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals designated 
below who survive the decedent: 
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(a) to the decedent's descendants per capita at each generation as defined 
in Subsection 75-2-106(2); 
(b) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally if 
both survive, or to the surviving parent; 
(c) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the 
decedent's parents or either of them per capita at each generation as defined 
in Subsection 75-2-106(3); 
(d) if there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent, 
but the decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or descendants of 
grandparents, half of the estate passes to the decedent's paternal grandpar-
ents equally if both survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to 
the descendants of the decedent's paternal grandparents or either of them if 
both are deceased, the descendants taking per capita at each generation as 
defined in Subsection 75-2-106(3); and the other half passes to the dece-
dent's maternal relatives in the same manner; but if there is no surviving 
grandparent or descendant of a grandparent on either the paternal or the 
maternal side, the entire estate passes to the decedent's relatives on the other 
side in the same manner as the half. 
(2) For purposes of Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d), any nonprobate transfer, 
as defined in Section 75-2-205, received by an heir is chargeable against the 
intestate share of such heir. , 
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 12, eff. July 1, 1998. ^ 
Uniform Law Comments 
[UPC § 2-103] 
This section provides for inheritance by necessary and confusing because the sys-
descendants of the decedent, parents and tern of representation in Section 2-106 
their descendants, and grandparents and gives equal shares if the decedent's de-
collateral relatives descended from grand- scendants are all of the same degree of 
parents; in line with modern policy, it k insnip to the decedent, 
eliminates more remote relatives tracing ^ , „ , , „ . ., 
through great-grandparents. The w o r d descendants replaces the 
Purpose and Scope of Revisions. The word "issue" in this section and through-
revisions are stylistic and clarifying, not o u t ^ revisions of Article II. The term 
substantive. The pre-1990 version of this l s s u e 1S a t e r m o f a r t h a v m g a biological 
section contained the phrase "if they are connotation. Now that inheritance rights, 
all of the same degree of kinship to the in certain cases, are extended to adopted 
decedent they take equally (etc.)." That children, the term descendants is a more 
language has been removed. It was un- appropriate term. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 2-103 of the Uni- Laws 1992, c. 30. 
form Probate Code (1990 Revision). See Volume 
8, Pts. I, II, Uniform Laws Annotated, Master 
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
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Library References 
Descent and Distribution @»25 to 43. CJ.S. Descent and Distribution §§ 27 to 29, 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 124k25 to 32 to 49. 
124k43. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Restatement (Second) of Property, Don. 
Trans. § 28.2, Class Gift to "Issue" or "De-
scendants". 
Restatement (Third) Property (Wills &. Don. 
Trans.)L§ 2.3, Intestate Share of Surviving 
Descendants. 
Restatement (Third) Property (Wills & Don. 
Trans.) § 2.4, Intestate Share of Surviving 
Ancestors and Collateral Relatives. 
Motes of Decisions 
In general 1 
Kindred of half-blood 2 
Siblings and their descendants 
1. In general 
Where deceased left surviving him only 
grandfather on maternal side and three aunts 
on paternal side, grandfather succeeded to de-
ceased's property as sole heir. Reed v. Knud-
son, 1932, 80 Utah 428, 15 P.2d 347. Descent 
And Distribution fc» 36 
2. Kindred of half-blood 
Under Comp. Laws, § 2749, providing that 
kindred of the half blood inherit equally with 
those of the whole blood, unless the inheritance 
come to the intestate by descent from some one 
of his ancestors, in which case all those who are 
not of the blood of such ancestor must be ex-
cluded, children of deceased's husband by a 
former wife cannot inherit from deceased an 
estate acquired by descent. Amy v. Amy, 1895, 
12 Utah 278, 42 P. 1121, affirmed 18 S.Ct. 802, 
171 U.S. 179, 43 L.Ed. 127, 
tribution G» 33 
Descent And Dis-
3. Siblings and their descendants 
Decedent's brothers and sisters were hot his 
"heirs" as defined in Uniform Probate Code and 
thus could not assert claims under wrongful 
death statute. U.C.A.1953, 75-1-201(17), 
75-2-103, 78-11-7. Kelson v. Salt Lake Coun-
ty, 1989, 784 P.2d 1152. D e a t h s 31(5) 
Under amended succession statute, children 
and grandchildren of deceased brother or sister 
stand in place of their1 predeceased parents and 
take on a representative basis regardless of 
whether any brother or sister of deceased is still 
living. U.C.A.1943, 101-4-5. In re Yonk's Es-
tate, 1949, 115 Utah 292, 204 P.2d 452. De-
scent And Distribution @» 34 
Where a mother having children as the issue 
of two marriages died after inheriting property 
from a deceased son, such property was distrib-
uted among his surviving brothers and sisters 
and their descendants of both the whole and the 
half blood, under Comp. Laws 1907, § 2840. 
Gardner's Estate v. Gardner, 1912, 42 Utah 40, 
129 P. 360. Descent And Distribution <®» 33 
§ 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 4 . Requirement that heir survive decedent for 120 hours 
An individual who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is considered to 
have predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt 
property, and intestate succession, and the decedent's heirs are determined 
accordingly. If it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that aii 
individual who would otherwise be an heir survived the decedent by 120 hours, 
it is considered that the individual failed to survive for the required period. 
This section is not to be applied if its application would result.in a taking of 
intestate estate by the state under Section 75-2-105. 
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 13, eff. July 1, 1998. 
47 
§75-2-106 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE INTTES 
(a) "Deceased descendant," "deceased parent," or "deceased grandpar-
ent" means a descendant, parent, or grandparent who either predeceased the 
decedent or is considered to have predeceased the decedent under Section 
75-2-104. 
(b) "Surviving descendant" means a descendant who neither predeceased 
the decedent nor is considered to have predeceased the decedent under 
Section 75-2-104. 
(2)(a) If, under Subsection 75-2-103(l)(a), a decedent's intestate estate or a 
part thereof passes "per capita at each generation" to the decedent's descen-
dants, the estate or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares as there 
are: 
(i) surviving descendants in the generation nearest to the decedent which 
contains one or more surviving descendants; and 
(ii) deceased descendants in the same generation who left surviving 
descendants, if any. 
(b) Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is allocated one 
share. 
(c) The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the 
same manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants 
as if the surviving descendants who were allocated a share and their surviv-
ing descendants had predeceased the decedent. 
(3)(a) If, under Subsection 75-2-103(l)(c) or (d), a decedent's intestate estate 
or a part thereof passes "per capita at each generation" to the descendants of 
the decedent's deceased parents or either of them or to the descendants of the 
decedent's deceased paternal or maternal grandparents or either of them, the 
estate or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares' as there are: 
(i) surviving descendants in the generation nearest the deceased parents 
or either of them, or the deceased grandparents or either of them, that 
contains one or more surviving descendants; and 
(ii) deceased descendants in the same generation who left surviving 
descendants, if any. 
(b) Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is allocated one 
share. 
(c) The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the 
same manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants 
as if the surviving descendants who were allocated a share and their surviv-
ing descendants had predeceased the decedent. 
(4) Any reference to this section found in a governing instrument for the 
definitions of "per stirpes," "by representation," or "by right of representation" 
shall be considered a reference to Section 75-2-709. 
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 15, eff. July 1, 1998. 
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INTESTATE SUCCESSION & WILLS § 75-2-108 
§ 75-2^107. Kindred of half blood 
Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they 
were of the whole blood. 
Laws 1975, c. 150, § 3. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law 8, Pts. I, II, Uniform Laws Annotated, Master 
This section is similar to § 2-107 of the Uni- Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
form Probate Code (1990 Revision). See Volume 
Library References 
Descent and Distribution @»35, 41. C.J.S. Descent and Distribution §§ 29, 42, 46. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 124k35; 
124k41. 
• _ . " Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Restatement (Third) Property (Wills & Don. 
Trans.) § 2.4, Intestate Share of Surviving 
Ancestors and Collateral Relatives. 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 1 from a deceased son, such property was distrib-
t uted among his surviving brothers and sisters 
and their descendants of both the whole and the 
1. In general half blood, under Comp. Laws 1907, § 2840. 
Where a mother haying children as the issue Gardner's Estate v. Gardner, 1912, 42 Utah 40, 
of two marriages died after inheriting property 129 P. 360. Descent And Distribution @» 33 
§ 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 8 . Afterborn heirs 
An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time 
if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth. 
Laws 1998, c. 39, § 16, eff. July 1, 1998. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Uniform Law Prior Laws: 
This section is similar to § 2-108 of the Uni- Laws 1975, c. 150. 
form Probate Code (1990 Revision). See Volume 
8, Pts. I, II, Uniform Laws Annotated, Master 
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
Library References 
Descent and Distribution @=>27. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 124k27. 
C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 34. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids Restatement (Third) Property (Wills & Don. 
Restatement (Second) of Property, Don. Trans.) § 2.1, General Principles and Defi-
Trans. § 26.1, Gifts Immediate in Form to nitions. 
Class-When Class Closes to After-Conceived 
and After-Adopted Persons. 
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UNIVERSITY OF UTABSCHOOL OFMEDICINE, 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH' 
DIVISION OF UROLOGY 
SEMEN STORAGE AGREEMENT 
The purpose oftht document it to act man agreementto store semen for thepurpase ofshortand/or long 
arrtjta^faJfrwM^ 
end between the University of Utah School ofMeaJdne, Division of Urology, Salt Lake Oty, Utah, hereinafter 
ujmetbnes referred to as »n. rTnhenkj," and $Q\A&- ^^\ whose address is kereafia'ehen and who is 
umetimssreferredtoas the "Donor". 
• ' . : ^ V . •.;,:•••••• AGREEMENT ..'.'•'•'."'-':/• 
J. The Donor has consulted frith a doctor and it has been determined that the 
Dotior may be an appropriate candidate to have his semen collected, evaluated, frozen and stored for his 
future use or other possible uses as hereinafter set forth. Semen is desired by the donor for one or more of 
Ae following reasons: 
A* .. Prior to vasectomy; 
ftp Pruir toinadiation and/or chemotherapy;. 
C Prior to exposure to potentially toxic medications; 
. D. • Priorto exposure to potentially toxkenytcmmentalcondkions; 
E. Prior to travel or extended abseme of the donor; 
F. Prior to ardficMmsembwdon; 
CI *. Priorto shipmentof'the semen to anotherlocation; 
H. .• . Or other reasons deemed'appropriate by my Doctor. 
1.' I hereby request that the University of Utah store my semen by cryopreservadon (storage in liquid 
nitrogen). 
3. 1 (donor) understand and agree to the follower 
A* To have a current semen analysis of my semen by the University of Utah Andrology laboratory to 
determine if my semen quaBty n sujfichrtto consider prsservotion byfr^ 
'•• besentto the Donor or DonorsDoctor evaluatingdie quality of the semen. 1 under stand that it is 
impossible to determine with absolute catainty if n^ semen wiUfreeze and tkxiwweUtnouzh to 
''contributed Jifuto^ 
- theuxhnujueofjreetfngan^ 
iriEbetiscouragedjromcryop^ 
ha dates will befoOoyved by the Um^ty 
. cryopreser^ationisunlikefytortsuhinviabksp^ 
, . A . ^ . ^ e j t o f c ^ / W a * ^*WWafrca«^>z£n/roin^ricm«fsample. 
CVLirnrp ( ^ «* ^ ^ £ ? 
thsuggestodthatatleast 12-15 viah be frozen for long term storage. The donor understands that 
ihauuoffroten^hawed sperm results m 
tparm Hkatrrertfy estimated 
cownpasrt tofrazen&awed sperm. Storage of 12-15 HaJsshouU result in 4-6months of trying to 
ackk^pregnancy wail btseminations. The donor understands that tkbupcssU 
dgi^enincSviduaTs semen lrfB be vote to mult in a pregnancy evm under ideal coruSthns. The 
moTerkbthatare stored the higher me d able to eventualfy result m a 
pregnancy £olboj^ 
Tlu storage of any semmsam^pla Attheendqfthe 
six month period the egresmentshaU be automatical^ • 
assuming aUqfthe obligations have been met as contained herein, and untU terminatedpursuant 
to the provisions cf this agreement 
The donor agreas to pay aU costs aucciatedwim 
of his soman. ThesechargeswO be billed m aa\anc*f<>r thefoBowing six~monlh period In the 
eimtt that th* agreement b automatical^ renewed fa 
- fee for ***** sample heldmfrozen storage by the .University. Currently the fee for a semen analysis 
b$70; the costforfreezingis 170 andthe costforfreezing and ttsUthaw is 17Qt The cost for long 
' term storage is currently MJS/vud/monm or a minimum charge of $&S/year. 
TheDonorunderstandsthatthe University has we right to mcrease any of me above fees without 
prior notice to the Donor. 
Any chargefor storageshall be paid wWrii thirty (SO) days of the data ofbilling, otherwise such 
charges shall be deemed deUnauent 
The Unhershy' shall release the rialfs) of Donor's frozen semen only upon written notice by the 
Donor and onty to a UcensedmeaYcal doctor or autho 
and upon compliance with reasonable procedures and policies which the University may from time 
to time establish, mcJudfog pcymsnt of a shlpjmgajid/or transfer fee. 
. This agreement ska&termmae, and the University's responsibility for storage shall cease, upon the 
occurrence of one or more of 'thefqUowing events: 
(a) ReleasefofaUthe semen samples according to me terms ofthis agreement and payment of 
theappQcable transferfee; . . . 
(b) Written direction by the Donor to the- University authorizing destruction of all semen 
samples retained in storage; 
. fc) The Donor's death; 
(d) Failure of the Donor to pay storage charges within the time provided in paragraph 3(F);-
(e/ _ Upon thirty (30) days writUn notification by the Universal 
mleniiohto-discontm 
•• intlu event oftho death of the donorthe donor would Oke his vials Ofsemen{mltialant ofJh* items 
below):. 
A Destroyed ' * ' • 
.*. Hcintamedm storage for future donation to £AfL* £(/&*(, ffWmnnm* 
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JC 
hi 
N. 
K. 
.Vj^**^*****^'* 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' - - ^ ^ ^ ^ 
r-M«ii**w»."««V"--» toH*~±d of loss, damage or destruction duringtkt 
"rZZ^IZZZXZttZ*-**"'?* 
2^i^^.^&-*-**-'--*^ fc- , , r. 
S S I T S X - * - ^ - ^ - - ^ ^ . ^ 
*11LTJZZ£ZO»«,^*'^''M<*" im**.*-?* 
,ZE£ZZZ^">^*~*y*''.''"lZ 
.SE^ZwN-*«**«—•-• - * • — - ^ r 
^^l!L*«*«^»^^»'^tod~™B^^/"d 
LMh^**xbri at the rmbr count ofmail by the Donor. 
SlrZZZZ^^ 
^ ^ t t ^ - ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
. V ^ ' j ^ ^ ^ 
iTpZ^f^Uni^. *»~*D~*n^»«^^"**-
nuaUrcctMeiuleckncwUdgedbyth^ • * . , _ _ . . . 
a m * * api********^^'^*'*^ ****!*• 
TkhagtumantskaSLbebindbig upon the administrators, heirs and successors of th* partus 
iw , ta»»^ «r -a *««« -**« *<*<"' *«"* ,Aflfl becoMtoUdi b>'and constr m 
(j?U 
aoeordancewiththelamcftheSteUojf'XJtttn^ 
MtheTUrdJnilcialDistrkXQ 
Tin egreawwit represents the entfr 
agiemmUSp or representations other than at set forth herein. The printed portion of this contract 
b*m contract bammduDon* Unbcrsky. Crossomts, written adautons, notes or otherwise 
do not otter or become part of this contract Written date and signatures do become part of this 
IN WITNESS WBEREOF, the 'parties hereto hdn effixedtheirhands andseals this JL2L2 **? 
Sfyfaet"*"!*''*. ™//fJrl/L--, 
'FE (sign***) 
f\\CMtK£L A. W&rS 
DONOR (phase print) 
Mft i- P?>U<r\ <?[. 
ADDRESS < t C y r ^ f l { 5 . 
(*o\) Htyyzt 
TELEPHONE NUMBER 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, DIVISION 
OF UROLOGY 
•<.ftdfr-
ADDRESS " : ~ " 
R*K0497 
STATE OF UTAH - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
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Utah Marriage Certification 
August 2 4 , 1997 
Date of Marriage 
Michae l A Burns 
Name of Groom 
Gayle L Berry 
Name of Bride 
1997026627 
F i l e Number 
22 
Age of Groom 
25 
Age of Bride 
S a l t Lake 
County of Issuance 
August 
Date 
27 , 2004 
Issued 
The original document, of which this is k 
photocopy, appears to be genuine anti 
unaltered and to have been made attht 
time purported.
 f 
This photocopy consists of (_ 
Signature 
Date. 
C^J^^^s^sisiSStr 
meJ&Lzz~ 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
VITAL RECORDS & STATISTICS 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
This is to certify that this is a true copy of the certificate on file in this office. This certified copy is issued 
under authority of section 26-2-22 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 As Amended. 
O OAXA-J £ /)&w0t6u 
Barry E. Nangle 
DIRECTOR OF VITAL RECORDS 
University of Utah School of Medicine 
jglasTXarrell,Ph.D.,H.C.LD. 
•ctor 
Irologyand 
Laboratories 
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April 10, 2003 
RE: Gayle Bums (spouse Michael) 
Dr* Heiner, 
Enclosed is the summary of the pre-freeze motility for vials cryopreserved for Michael 
Burns for the date sent. Gayle has had four inseminations with Tina Goldsmith, under the 
rection of Dr. Jeffrey Quinn, using-.one vial for each attempt. 
Also enclosed is a copy of the recommended thawing protocol for vials frozen at the 
University of Utah Andrology Laboratory. 
The following vials have been sent to your facility: 
/ 
Patient name 
Michael Burns 
# vials 
5 
date 
6/1/2000 
any assistance 
Thank you for your time and attention for this patient. If you have any questions or need 
istance, please let me know. • 
i 
- oincerely, 
QffiSA^1-
Debbie Cartmill, M.S., T.S. 
Andrology Program Manager 
University of Utah School of Medicine 
675 Arapeen Orivc 
Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
(801)581-3740 
FAX (801) 581*6127 
The original document, ot which tnis m -
ptotocopy, appears to be genuine at* 
unaltered and to have been made at tto 
time purported. 
This photocopy consists of f 
Signatufi 
'>*teSL \jz#jat Tttte *$L 
Reproductive Care Center 
1220 East 3900 South, Suite 4-G, Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Phone (801) 268-0306 Fax (801) 268-6234 • 
8-18-04 
Re: Gayle Burns 
To Whom It May Concern: 
The Reproductive Care Center used sperm from Michael Burns sent to us from the 
University of Utah to inseminate the eggs of Gayle Burns to create 9 embryos, two of 
which were transferred to Gayle on 5/3/03, and 7 of which were frozen for possible later 
use. Attached is a copy of the letter from University of Utah regarding Michael's sperm. 
Gayle subsequently delivered a baby boy on December 23,2003, approximately four 
weeks prior to her normal due date, assuring that Michael was the father. 
If you have any questions in this regard, please do no hesitate to call* 
Sincerely, 
The original document, of which this is a 
photocopy, appears to be genuine and 
unaltered and to have been made at the 
time purported. 
This photocopy consists of. 
Signature 
OateS^flSt Title &L-~-
University of Utah School of Medicine 
Douglas T. Carrell, Ph.D., H.C.LD. 
Director 
Andrologyand . 
IVF Laboratories 
August 5,2004 
;• 7 5 
RE: Gayle Bums 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I have been asked by Mrs Gayle Burns to write the followingletter. In April of 2000 her 
husband, Michael Burns was diagnosed with cancer. As part of his therapy, his doctor suggested 
that he have sperm cryopreserved. Mr. Burns had sperm cryopreserved at our laboratory, and as 
part of the process filled out a consent/storage contract. That contract has a legal clause asking 
the depositor to indicate what action should be taken with the semen in the event of his death. 
Mr* Burns indicated that he would like the sample legally transferred to his wife, Gayle Burns. 
Following the passing of Mr. Burns, Gayle worked with Dr. James Heiner to undergo fertility 
treatments using the previously cryopreserved sperm. Our laboratory released the sperm to Gayle 
Burns for her treatment under Dr. Heiners care. If you have further questions please feel free to 
contact me. 
Sincerely, 
Douglas ft Carrell, Ph.D., H.C.L.D. Dougl  
Associate Professor of Surgery(Urology), GB/GYN and Physiology 
Director of Andrology and IVF Laboratories 
University of Utah School of Medicine 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
(801)581-3740 
DTC/vsf 
675 Arapeen Drive 
The original document, of which this m * 
photocopy, appears to be genuine ant: 
unaltered and to have been made at the 
time purported. 
This photocopy consists o f _ ( _ pages 
*gna tu«£ l l t f fo?<r^^ 
Salt Lake City Utah 84108 ^^^pt^jj^t Title ^ ^ 
(801)581-3740 
FAX (801) 581-6127 
fiH-QP m 
"^v m xv#i-»ww i fr*#-lfc*"WI W l I W l % I University of Utah School of Medicine 
50 N. Medical Dr. Suite 3B208 - Salt Lake City; UT 84132 • (801) 581-3740 
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURES FORM 
—'•siourns 
foyfaUwBurtw 
vim 7 6 
lib • 
tal Abstinence 
- ? ^ days 
3 received 
UN 115--15 
Collection Site 
$ U o f U 
D comm lab 
D home 
• other 
Container 
Of sterile 
D sterile w/media 
D SCD 
D other 
3 collected (if different) 
iments 
Last Name, First Name (dob) 
Burns, Michael 7/23/75 
Burns, Gayle Lisa 6/13/71 
Referring Physician Douglas T. Carrell PhJ3. 
Consulting Physician . ' . . . • ' . '. -.'.-. - ' • 
Male 
Female 
33I3SSU 
HEPT 0 Cervical Mucus Interaction 
Sperm Storage: 0 STS (Short Term Storage) 
D pre-IVF JiC LTS (Long Term Storage) 
Vials Frozen: ^ bv "TH*- Test Thaw Date 
Destination: Q University Lab J4teiversity LTS Facility 
D other • (attach supporting paperwork) 
gw 
iple' ^'ized: D fresh D frozen 
Bgi etration 
mber of eggs tested 
Tiber of eggs penetrated 
nber of sperm on egg surface 
*rm penetrations per egg 
Enhancement: Q refrigeration 
INITIAL AFTER ENHANCEMENT 
D ionophore 
NORMAL 
> 1 5 % 
>20 
>3 
>1 
1 
D other 
Control Value 
by 
% 
ume: ^ 
xtial i S L mL by 
mL by 
mL by 
amorphous peroxidase+ -mmmmsEBsmm 
rial 
jred Viscosity or Agglutination 
•nments: 
. cells/hpf 
. cells/hpf 
. cells/hpf 
Progressive Motility: 
Motility Score: 
Concentration: 
Total Progressively Motile: 
INITIAL 
^hi 
3C±\ 
FINAL 
. % 
.million/mL 
million 
:AD$-
Tie 
e 
ill 
*red 
mature 
licate 
arphous 
iments _ 
[MtMliLC^Il! 
NORMAL 
>55% 
< 5% 
< 5% 
<25% 
<15% 
< 5% 
<10% 
llMMIIUIMILIUJJiigiBar 
TAILS: 
normal 
no tail 
short tail 
coiled tail 
bent tail 
two tails 
midpiece defect 
NORMAL 
>65% 
(% Progressive Motility / Concentration) 
HUSBAND DONOR NORMAL 
.by. 
Initial 
30 minutes 
60 minutes 
90 minutes 
comments _ 
> 40%/1:100 
40%/1:10 
> 35%/1:20 
> 30%/1:20 
by__ . 
Initial motility: i ^ 2 _ (4) H \ (2) \V> (2) <Q rt) I V (0). concentration - 1 : 4 - ° ° 
motility:, 
motility:, 
motility:. 
motility:, 
motility:, 
motility:. 
motility:. 
.(4) 
.(4) 
.(4) 
(4) 
.(4) 
(4) 
(4) 
.(3) 
.(3) 
.(3) 
.(3) 
.(3) 
.(3) 
.(3) 
.(2) 
.(2) 
.(2) 
.(2) 
.(2) 
.(2) 
.(2) 
.(D 
.0) 
.(D 
.(D 
.0) 
.(D 
.0) 
. (0), concentration - 1 
. (0), concentration - 1 
. (0), concentration - 1 
,(0), concentration-1 
. (0), concentration - 1 
. (0), concentration - 1 
. (0), concentration - 1 
byJJjL 
b y _ 
by 
by 
by 
b y _ 
b y _ 
b y _ 
•jew ami R^kase 
TS> P.nmmonk 
(J\8 
Michael and Gayle Lisa Burns (00-153-016) * * cc: Patient 
June 7,2000 • ; 
The copy of the June 1* sperm freezing and storage results indicates a normal sperm motility and 
concentration prior to freezing. Nine vials were frozen from this sample. 
Sincerely, 
DICTATED BY CHARLES CORNWELL 
AND MAILED WITHOUT SIGNATURE 
IN HIS ABSENCE TO AVOID DELAY 
Charles E. Cornwell, MT, BS 
for 
Douglas T. Carrell, Ph.D., H.C.L.D. 
Assistant Professor of Surgery (Urology), Physiolojgy and Ob-Gyn 
Director of Andrology and IVF Laboratories 
Division of Urology 
University of Utah School of Medicine 
Salt Lake City, UT 84132 
(801)581-3740 
CECVjir 
The original document, ot which this i% 
photocopy, appears to be genuine art 
unaltered and to have been made at tfv 
time purported. 
This photocopy consists of_2L~page& 
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STATE OF UTAH - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH j g H g 
&&& 
LOCAL FLE NUMBER 
STATE OF UTAH - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
18-1366 CERTIFICATE OF DEATH STATE F W NUMBER 78 
i 
w 
CO 
P 
DECEDENT 
INFORMANT 
DISPOSITION 
20. METNOO OF DISPOSITION 
|QtEr t *ntam«*Q2.DonatW Q ' j . 
| g d Burial Q t C r a t M l i o n Q s . 
CERTIFIER 
REGISTRAR 
EOF DECEDENT FOIST 
MJCHAEL AARON 
4. DATE OF BIRTH (kkx. Oay. Yr.) 
July 23, 1975 
LAST 
BURNS 
S.AGE-
25 
Ba. PLACE | HOaPrTALftMwiPHi.»r»>^^ir»f'AU.OTHEft LOCATIONS: 
2. SEX 
Hale 
°^J«,KH*-*« ' ID 
ami \QZBUQ**W •s.DQA , f j 
8C CITY, TOWN. OR LOCATION OF DEATH 
Salt Lake City 
"ttn 
Ql.Y«|3aLNo 
S.tt**igHoiM Q l 
J.Otmftfmd^^ , 
3ft. DATE OF OEATH (Ma, Oaf. WJ 
March 24 , 2001 
8. BIRTHPLACE (C*> ft Slofcorftoftjton CMM»y) 17. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
Salt Lake City, Utah 1 529-49-0701 
3b. TiJlE OF DEATH (Mr. doc*) 
log? 
Bb. NAME OF HOSPITAL NURStNO HOME OR OTHER FAOUTY 
Of otftUt a ttdkr, « * • abaat « * * • * * of fecaftnj 
University Hospital 
ft* COUNTY OF DEATH 
Salt Lake 
11. MARITAL STATUS 
| Q l . | l a * e r M « r k j d O 
HzM-nMd Q < 
|aSURVtVWOBPOUSEflrt*«k.ttV«/MtoM«m»; 
Cavle Berry 
^SS^SOT-W 8 * * - * ' * 
Phlebotomiet 
13*. RESIOENCC - STREET AND NUMBER 
1499 South Roberta Street 
13*. INSIDE crnr 
UMJT37 
B l . Y * i 
Q J . N O 
13f.SPCODE 
84115 
LCftY* TOWN OR COMMUNITY 
Salt Lake City 
I d WAS DECEDENT OF HISPANIC ORIGIN? (UyiSpmdfy) • 1.YM [ x J l N o 
Q t. Marten Q 2, Cuban 
Q 3. Puerto Wean Q d Other <Spedry)_ 
17. FATHERS NAME (Hrtt, A****. U*0 
William Dewey Burns 
12b. KIND OF BU5IC8S OR W0U5TRY 
ARUF/Medical 
13C COUNTY 
Salt Lake 
IS. RACE -Blec*, WNta, Am. 
' may be era 
MSotdryj 
Caucasian 
16. MAIDEN NAME OF MOTHER fflfat ft 
Louise Goates 
13d STATE 
Utah 
IS. EDUCATION taaceV or* ftfenesf 
gndaeamplaiMS) Eiamanlaryor 
Sacondvy (M2)Co8ipa ( IMS 
or 17*) 
16 
19. NAME, RELATK3NSWP AND MAILING A0DRES8 OF INFORMANT 
WIFE: Gayle Burns / 1499 South Roberta Street / Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
21a. DATE OF DISPOSITION 
March 27, 20011 
•yiPMAJURE OF FUNER^LSERWCE UCEN8EE j 
ISXJATE DECEASEfrWAStAST 128. fc^WBad 
31b, PLACE OF DISPOSmON (nameof cwmr*r. 
Cftfiiajuty, ttrovtafplaoa) 
Larkin Sunset Lawn 
I23. LICENSEE NUMBER 95-270363 
/TATTOOED BY CCRTIFYINO PHYSICIAN 
March 2 4 , 2001 
If ye*, anloritt data end Itor reported 
M.E.CASENO. H R _ 
|21«. LOCATION -C*r or Town, State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
24. FUNERAL HOME (Nairn andaddnua) 
TS-TST Larkin Mortuary 260 E. South Temple 
SLC Utah 84111 
27i CERTIFIER ' 
] Q 1. CERTIFYING PHYSICIAN: TotebealofairlirwiieidBa, o a ^ 
O 2. MEDICAL E^INERflAWENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL: Ontobeekof BxamlmrtJanentfD/lnMai^ lima, da**, p»aca end dm to the 
27b. 8IONATURE AND TITLE OF 
LNAOTANOA 
/£. h*£>* 
Vc LICENSE NUMBER 
88-178621-1205 
27d DATE SIGNED fMorWh. Day, Year) 
March 28. 2001 
28. GAN  DORES8 OF PERSON^HO CERTIFIED THE CAUSE OF DEATH (lam 31) (TfraPrint) 
John R. Michael, M* D» 50 N Medical Drive. Salt Lake City. Utah 84132 
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This is to certify that this is a true copy of the certificate on file in this office. This certified copy is issued 
undet-authority of section 26-2-22 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 As Amended. 
> i CERTIFICATION OF VITAL RECORD S M 
y UTAH CERTIFICATION OF LIVE BIRTH 
Ian Michael Burns 
Sex of Child: Male 
Birth Weight: 06 Lbs 01 oz 
City of Birth: Murray 
Birth Attendant: Jeffrey D. Quinn, M.D. 
Date of Birth December 23,2003 
Time of Birth: 12:44 
County of Birth: Salt Lake 
Place of Birth: Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center 1 
Gayle Lisa Berry 
Mother's Maiden Nafne 
Mother's Date of Birth: August 13, t971 
Resident City: Salt Lake City 
Mothers Place of Birth: New York 
Resident State/Country: Utah 
Michael Aaron Bums 
"... Fathers Name , -
Father's Date d? Birth: July 23,1975 Father's Piece of Birth: Utah 
/ 1 
Date of Registration: December 31,2003 
Date of Amendment: September 3,2004 
SSA Card Requested: Yes 
"State File Number: 2003 50021 
DATE ISSUED: September 11,2006 
This is an exact reproduction of the document registered in the State Office of Vital Statistics. 
Security features of this official document Include: Intaglio Border, V & R images in top cycloids, 
ultra violet fibers and hologram image of a hawk over the word valid. This document displays the 
date, seal and signature of the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. 
Updated Utah State Seal replaces hawk over valid for authenticity. 
th»uA)£ %Jn*JL 
Barry E. Nangle 
State Registrar 
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No father l i s t e d 
Date of b irth 
Place of b irth 
« , FACTS A» THEY fl 
Michael Aaron Burng 
July 23,1975 
Utah 
Certificate of father,ft 
I's birth certificate>Proofg: Marriage certificate,Death 
t ^ Aaron Burns. Letter from Reproductive Cafe Canter 
Sperm Cryopregerved & Inaqftination Agreement, Contract from U of p Hospital to 
Inseminate Gavle Burns with gpenq from the father in the event of hi 
•>oyo tocoi ond fftof OJM yojonooon ylwoii to OVO ooo QQWOOH 
death *>lt/L ^ t 
* NOTARY rUBLIC 
WEMDV BENTLEY 
28fl North MOO Wt#l 
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**• •* '-TI Expires 
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DATE ISSUED: 
SEP 11 
This Is an exact reproduction of the document registered in the State Office of Vital Statistics 
Security features of this official document Include-Intaglio Border V4 Rinwaes, l i r t o n « 2 . 
ultra violet fibers.and htMograrn Image of a hawk over A ^ t o l t t S S t t t t S S S 
Updated Utah Stale Seal replaces hawk over valid tor authenticity. 
*~f*W llllllllill Barry E. Nangle 
State Registrar 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
Utah Birth Certification 
82 
Ian Michael Burns 
Name of Child 
Male 
Sex of Child 
December 23, 2003 
Date of Birth 
12:44 
Time of Birth 
06 Lbs 01 oz 
Birth Weight 
Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center 
• Place of Birth 
Murray 
City of Birth 
Sa l t Lake 
County of £ i r t h 
Jeffrey D. Quinn, M.D. 
Birth Attendant 
« f ^ ( M % A i l S l « W M i y < W A < < V l W ^ ^ i y < V I V I V ^ M ^ « » < V A l ^ M < V ^ M M ^ I W ^ ^ < V N ^ A l M M n < « 
Gayle Lisa Berry 
Mother' s Maiden Name 
. STATE OF UTAH - DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH - OFFICE OF VITAL RECORDS AND STATISTICS
 ft * 
AFFIDAVIT TO AMEND A RECORD < 8 3 
THIS AFFIDAVIT FORM CAN ONLY BE USEDT6 MAKECORRECTIONS ON BIRTH RECORDS 1699TO THE PRESENT 
All vital records are registered as received. Changes must be made by affidavit. An item on the birth certificate may be changed by 
affidavit only once; subsequent changes to the same item must be done by court order. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
NOT WRIT!- |M THE FIRS? SECTION. Items 1a through 6, have been completed by our office according to the information on the original record, even If 
incorrect Corrections and missing Information are NOT to be entered in these spaces ' 
2 |.|yr MHQBR J ™ Bb- opposite each of the incorrect Items, the correct information as It should have been stated at the time of birth. Please type or print 
neatly. If adding a name, Include the full name, Including any middle name If additional corrections are required, contact our office to prepare a revised affidav 
3 {JEMS Q and 1 o are generally completed by our office 
4. yyvjo iflAV S|fiN THE AFFIDAVIT IP THE REGISTRANT IS 1B YEARS OR OLDER: The person whose record is being amended must sign as one of the 
witnesses, unless mentally Incompetent or physically incapacitated. Parents or other older relatives are preferred witnesses for the second signature An 
exception may be made if both parents are able to sign. The signatures must be notarized. Do not sign the affidavit except in front of a notary. 
5 WH9 MAY S>QN T H g AFFIDAVIT IF THE REQISTRANT IS UND&t 16 YEARS OF AGE; Both parents listed on the record If no father is listed on the recor 
an older relative of legal age may sign with the mother The signatures must be notarized. Do not sign the affidavit except in front of a notary. 
6. R ^ D THE AFFIDAVIT. IT IS BINDING UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY. The signatories assume complete responsibility for the correctness of the amende 
information. Two different persons must complete the supporting oaths (items 11 through 15, and 16 through 20.) 
7 DO NOT WRfTP IN SPACES 21 OR 22. (This Is reserved for the State Registrar) 
8. WHEN PROPFjflt V COMPLETED AND SIGNED return this form to the Office of Vital Records and Statistics, 288 North 1460 West, P O Box 141012, SLC, 
UT 84114*1012 If acceptable for registration, it will be filed and become a permanent part of the original record 
£££: tf the affidavit Is completed within on* year of the date of birth, there is no fee for filing I t However, there Is a $12.00 fee for the search of the record which Includes a 
certified copy of the amended birth certificate. If It Is filed after one year, there Is a $20.00 fee for registration of the affidavit which Includes one certified copy of the 
a n v - ^ d certificate. 
IF THE APPLICANT OOES NOT RESPOND TO A WRITTEN REQUEST FROM THIS OFFICE WITHIN * 0 OAVS, THE OFFICE WILL RETAIN ALL MONIES PAID. 
AMENDED 
2 of 2 2003 50021 STATE CERTIFICATE NUMBER 
INFORMATION AS 
REPORTED ON THE 
ORIGINALLY 
REGISTERED 
CERTIFICATE 
1a FIRST NAME 
Ian 
2 SEX 
Male 
.lb MIDDLE NAME 
Michael 
1c LAST NAME 
|3 DATE OF BIRTH 
December 23f2003 
£ NAME OF FATHER 
|4 PUCE OF OCCURRENCE-City and County 
Murray, Salt Lake County 
Burns 
6 MAIDEN NAME OF MOTHER 
Gayle Lisa Berry 
HOSPITAL (if applicable) 
bottomrood Hospital 
MAKE NO CORRECTIONS ABOVE THIS LINE 
STATEMENT OF 
AMENDMENTS 
7 ITEM 
wmssL 
8a FACTS EXACTLY AS STATED ON THE ORIGINAL RECORD 
No father l i s t e d 
Date of birth 
Place of b ir th 
8b FACTS AS THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN STATED ON THE 
ORIGINAL AT THE TIMF OF OCCURRENCE 
Michael Aaron Burns 
July 23f1975 
Utah 
>CHANGE 
.iSSARY? 
pftdd deceased father to child's birth certificate .Proofs: Marriage certificate, Death 
Certificate of father,Michael Aaron Burns. Letter from Reproductive Care Center,
 m 
PROOFS USED TO 
AMEND RECORD 
ffiperm Cryopreserved & Insemination Agreement,Contract from U of U Hospital to 
inseminate Gayle Burns with sperm from the father in the event 
I hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I have personal knowledge of the 
[above facts and that the Information given Is true and correct 
OATH OF FIRST 
WITNESS 
.QVAA 
ttlfiE SIGNED 
mmtnamAn^g^Bm 
IS ADDRESS OF WITNESS (Street. City. Stats. Zip) , , 
©DlS"?af*wertofoOfc. Un.^ZZS" 
gfll+MrteCi»HA UT SHIT 
N'JTAJRV PUBLIC 
WEN0 v UNTIES 
;*6Cw*» 
Jtnh 01: 
I hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I have personal knowledge of the 
jabove facts and that the Information given Is true and correct 
OATH OF SECOND 
WNESS 
UDOHOVRS-9 
REV.P9M 
16. MATUREOFWITNI 
J V T V J / ^ 
ESS' 19 
17 DATE SIGNED 
£r3 -
feO ADDRESS OF WITNESS (Street, City, State, Zip! 
^/toJLSj^A^j*^ 
Ufff 7e>x&><& <&-,*;*s^ ucfj/&> 
Subscribed & 
Notary Public, 
MyCoi 
S 
E 
A 
|L 
WENDY BENTlEv 
28BNcmh :460VMst 
.sals LakeC'iy. 'Ji2h *«' i» 
*.iy Co^nr.iss'on £*p"t-
May 27. 200? 
yiATK.OF \"WL 
FOR USE OF STATE BT DATE ACCEPTED |22 OFFICE OF THE §J£TE REGISTRAR ^  ^ J f It ftnfr 
104 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Holladay,UT84117 
Telephone: (801)277-4292 
Facsimile: (801)277-4295 
l c / - ? r * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUVENILE C O I R ' 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNT* . 
IN THE MATTER Or IAN M BURNS, 
(DOR 12/23/03) 
A Minor Child. 
PETITION FOR ADJUDICATION OF 
PATERNITY 
Case No: 
Judge 
COMES NOW Gayle M. Burns, natural parent and guardian of the above-named minor, by 
;
 ' '- -- • ;.-. • ...i uic <.!.>!. .:. :.-iiows: 
1 petitione; and minor child are resident.*- -tl'Saitl ake County and jurisdiction 
is proper. 
' • I - . . , -K-r '••». . . . • 
;at Gayle M Burns was married u Michael .\ Burns on August 24, 1997 in Salt 
Lake ('ounty, Utah. (See attached and incorporated Exhibit 1). 
'.. ~~rly 2000 Michael A. Burns was diagnosed withNon-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. 
ai Michael A. Burns subsequently entered a treatment program that included 
chemothe py. 
^ 
C 
O ^OKIifei ij lPASE^ 
6. That prior to his receiving chemotherapy he was informed by his physicians that his 
semen could be rendered sterile by the chemotherapy. 
7. That Michael A. Burns and his wife, Gayle M. Burns, did discuss their options to 
preserve his semen in order to conceive children in the future. 
8. That on or about May 30, 2000 Mr. and Mrs. Burns entered into a Semen Storage 
Agreement at the University of Utah School of Medicine, Division of Urology. (See attached and 
incorporated Exhibit 2). 
9. That in the Agreement it stated in 3(1): 
"In the event of the death of the donor, the donor would like 
his vials of semen (b) Maintained in storage for future donation to 
Gayle Bums who will assume all of the obligations and terms 
described in this contract." 
10. Michael A. Bums' medical condition turned significantly worse in late 2000 and he 
specifically discussed with Gayle M. Bums the fact that if he did pass away that he would like his 
wife to receive artificial insemination of his stored semen and to give birth to their child. 
11. This idea of stored semen and future artificial insemination was also discussed with 
numerous friends and family members by Mr. Burns. 
12. That Michael A. Burns did pass away on March 24, 2001. (See attached and 
incorporated Exhibit 3). 
13. That subsequently Gayle M. Burns, natural mother of Ian M. Burns, was artificially 
inseminated with Mr. Burns' semen on or about May 3,2003 with subject child, Ian M. Burns, being 
born on December 23,2003. (See attached and incorporated Exhibit 4). 
Petition for Adjudication of Paternity 
Case No. 2 
. 106 
• 14.'. '• That on (he original birfhwrtificateoflm « -
natural father. (See attached and incorporated Exhibit 5) , • 
15. . That subsequciuh tia^icK.. barn;. u.opctiiK)! .—; ;a;,, >epartineiii oi \ H'JL \ L X I : . -
to add the name of Michael A Burns as the natural father to Ian M. Burns' birth certificate. • (See . .' 
attached and ii . : • Y •'•'.. • •'•'' '• ' "• .-... • • .''•.. •' ' ' ' • • -;•.• ..• 
16. 1 hat this, amendment to the birth certificate was' accepted by the State of Utah,, on, or 
:Knn September ^ 2004 and an amended birth certificate < was issued. (See attached and 
: , v . . - p o . . , i ' . - 7 Y ' • ' • • • "" . - . ; ; ' : . • . ' • : ' " • ' • • • • ' • " • • ' " ' . " . . " ' • • • ' " • . : 
••17. ..••.. That-Gayle M Burns did submit a claim,, to the Social, Security Administration ;' 
18. •' That, said, claim, was denied by the Social Security Administration. . • • • : ' 
hat pursuant to UCA § 75-2-114(1) and I JCA §§ 78-45a-7,78-45a-10,78-45e, and 
78-45g(l), etseq., petitioner respectfully requests :'.h-. .:: *. .ki . aiki v.n.. >nc:; •• >c ' 
for acijudication of paternity declaring Michael A Burn* the natural father of Ian M Bur- -
20. ' . 1 hat pursuant t,< T JCA § 78 4,5 A -6 55 the stainlaitl o! proof is by a pu-poiulaaiu c 
of the evidence 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 4 _ day of November, 2007. ". 
Petition for Adjudication of Paternity 
Case No. 3 
121 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
.-)Jy 
I hereby certify that on the I y day of November 2007,1 mailed, via the United States post 
office, postage prepaid, a true and. correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
ADJUDICATION OF PATERNITY, to the following: 
Social Security Administration 
Office of Regional Counsel 
Federal Building 
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001-A 
Denver, CO 80294-1961 
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen 
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review 
125 State Street, Suite 3102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84138 
Utah Attorney General 
State Capital Complex 
East Office Building #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 . 
A rfnt^iyQai^ 
Lisa T. Hatton-Ward/Legal Assistant 
Petition for Adjudication of Paternity 
Case No. 4 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Holladay,UT84117 
Telephone: (801) 277-4292 
Facsimile: (801)277-4295 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF IAN M. BURNS, : REQUEST FOR HEARING 
(DOB: 12/23/03) : 
AMmoi Child. . : 
: Case No. 074904953 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
COMES NOW Gayle M. Burns, natural parent mid (.'lurilun nl I hi' abnu-narnnl in nun hy 
Iirough counsel, William R iladley. and hereby request- a hcarir^ in the above-entitled matter. 
RESPECTFU1 l,Y sul , Jam -H. 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY-C-
Attorney for Petitiofier 
.147 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the If) day of January 2008,1 mailed, via the United States post 
office, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING, to 
the following: 
Social Security Administration 
Office of Regional Counsel 
Federal Building 
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001-A 
Denver, CO 80294-1961 
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen 
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review 
125 State Street, Suite 3102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84138 
Utah Attorney General 
State Capital Complex 
East Office Building #320
 v. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
,jy<*-7< ^ 7 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Lisa T. Hatton-Ward/Legal Assistant 
Request for Hearing 
Case No. 074904953 2 
t36o Atpo 
Afir&Bl 
( j ^ n s f n ) .' 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY #52*. 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2225 E. Murray Holladay ltd, Ste J.M 
Holladay,UT84117 
Telephone: (801) 277-4292 
Facsimile: (801) 277-4295 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
1 h : b MATTER OF U BURNS, 
(DOB: 12/23/03) 
A Minor Child. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No: 074904953 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
Please be advised that the Hearing in the above-entitled matter will be held on Tuesday, February 5, 
DATED this ^ '•/ day of January, 2008. . 
. • • / • • • 
<^^^k 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY V 
Attorney for Petitioner' 
^ 
f t
 N H 9 -* • •• > ' ' 
; 162 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
HEARING was mailed to the individual(s) named below by placing a true and correct copy in the United 
i / th isO_day States mail, postage prepaid, . day of January, 2008. 
Social Security Administration 
OfiBce of Regional Counsel 
Federal Building 
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001-A 
Denver, CO 80294-1961 
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen 
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review 
125 State Street, Suite 3102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84138 
Utah Attorney General 
State Capital Complex 
East Office Building #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Notice of Hearing 
In the Matter of Ian M. Burns 
Case No. 074904953 
ffiur^SK kfttiSfrM^^ 
Lisa T. Hatton-Ward 
Legal Assistant 
c\\y^ 
I j "? O i--* c " 
163 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Holladay,UT84117 
Telephone: (801)277-4292 
Facsimile: (801)277-4295 
ce/u 
'ear 
fte, 
aJZ* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COl IRT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN UIE MATTER OF IAN M. BURNS, REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Case No. 074904953 
i »>'\ > v -,l . -« . )y and through COUIISC 
hereby requests a heanni; m thi-abovcciitiik-c niatu-
RESPECTFULLY suDmiued this »'•' dt.v M' Febn.an • 
, and 
WILLIAM R. HADElEY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
V- , / 
-e ^ \ ^ *-
wuCsh^\ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ day of February 2008,1 mailed, via the United States post 
office, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING, to 
the following: 
Social Security Administration 
Office of Regional Counsel 
Federal Building 
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001-A 
Denver, CO 80294-1961 
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen 
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review 
125 State Street, Suite 3102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84138 
Utah Attorney General 
State Capital Complex 
East Office Building #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Hfii^-i^ ffife^Wl 
Lisa T. Hatton-Ward/Legal Assistant 
Request for Hearing 
Case No. 074904953 2 
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i ' I IO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
Civil No: 074904953 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
COMES NOW. Wilhan; K iiudlc>. counsel fen Petitioners, and submits for sigii.:iun tin 
l li'ik-i'on Million In \IIRIU1. I indin|.', ul I n'l IIKI I (inclusion > ul I ,n\ mil I tiilci mil nn nli|a tnnr 
having been filed with the court or this office, and submits the same for two Orders on said matters. 
DATED this__; J:r of April 2008. 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the{ day of April 2008,1 mailed, via the United States post office, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION, 
to the following: 
Elizabeth "Beth" Anne Park 
169 Mountain Peak Drive 
Draper, UT 84020 
Social Security Administration 
Office of Regional Counsel 
Federal Building 
1961 Stout Street, Ste 1001 -A 
Denver, CO 80294-1961 
The Honorable Donald R. Jensen 
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review 
125 State Street, Suite 3102 
Salt Lake City, UT 84138 
Utah Attorney General 
State Capital Complex 
East Office Building #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
'^ lU^BrlO^J Jr 
Lisa T. Hatton-Ward/Legal Assistant 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
In the Matter of Ian M. Burns 
Case No. 074904953 AD 
h~ 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Holladay,UT84117 
Telephone: (801)277-4292 
Facsimile: (801) 277-4295 
By. 
FILED DISTRICT GOBRT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 5 2088 
SALT i AKE COUNT\ \/}Op 
Deputy Cierk 
IN THE THIRD J UDICI AI , DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR, SAL'I I A K E COUNT* ,'STATE OF HI ' Jill 
i MA; i b K O F I A N N 1 BI IR NS , 
(DOB 12/23/03) 
. J inor Child . ' • 
OR DER ON MOTION Til!" ,• n„ l"\ 11I«",I I l l 
Judge Anihoin B i.^ u \-
this matter shall include tin hstate ol Michael A. Burns, by and though his special aamimslrator 
Elizabeth I *ark -r 
2008, \.a.-v M «.\ )Wo02n * w> sucit pvsiiHUi 1 urtnci, 1 n/aheiii - aik did appeal at ai^ acar,:^ 
scheduled in t his matter on, March 18, 2008 at .the hour of 10:00 a.m and waived service and,, notice 
this court: in this matter. 
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DATED this / J day of April, 2008. 
BY THE 
HONOMMg W M B. QUINN 
lliirdDisW^'"' '^ "^ 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON Fll 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, S^LT; 
COUNTY, STATEJ3FJUTAH. 
DATE: i ^t^ffi ' ^ 
.fyD^rif^ C-
' DEPJ/TY COURT CLERK 
Order on Motion to Amend 
Case No. 0/'4904953 
°t 
C-
WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Holladay,UT84117 
Telephone: (801)277-4292 
Facsimile: (801) 277-4295 
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IN 1 U1 TfflRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
1 \ \M> i 'i > vLT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF I T SH 
D^  iili ivin i I bK Or i -i 
(DOB: 12/23/0^ 
A Minor Child. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i i "M 904953 
JuiJue Antlio;;\ H. Quinn 
llie abme-nititlulai'tiiiiihiiviiiguHiu'.mlri lit-aiuij.1 "Ullie IXlluluy nl N'an li ..''"'N 
in open court before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn and the petitioner, Gayle M. Burns, and for 
special administrator over the Estate of Michael A. Burns, Third Judicial District Court Case No. 
083900243, Pro Se, and the parties having been sworn, and the matter having been full < presented 
to the Court; the Court now being fully advised makes the following Findings « : 1 act and 
Conclusions of Law: 
m 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the petitioner, Gayle M. Burns and Michael A. Burns, deceased, were married 
on August 24,1997. 
2. That on or about April 20, 1999 Michael A. Burns was diagnosed with Non-
Hodgkin's Lymphoma and at a meeting with his physician was given a 95% survival rate, and he 
submitted himself to treatment which included chemotherapy and radiation. 
3. That one of the side-effects of these treatments was the possibility of sterility and he 
did enter into a Semen Storage Agreement with the University of Utah Reproductive Center and with 
his wife, Gayle Burns, to store his sperm in the event that he was rendered sterile after chemotherapy 
and radiation treatments. 
4. That the Semen Storage Agreement was entered into between the parties on or about 
May 30, 2000. In this Semen Storage Agreement it indicated that if something should happen to 
Michael A. Burns, that he "Would like his vials of semen.. .Maintained in storage for future donation 
to Gayle Burns." 
5. That in personal conversations with his wife, Gayle Burns, Michael A. Burns did 
express his desire to use the stored semen to have a child in the future by artificial means if he was 
rendered sterile by the treatments. 
6. That Mr. Burn's condition took a turn for the worse and on or about February 2001 
his chances of surviving the disease were greatly reduced and this led to his death on March 24, 
2001. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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7. That in the last month of Mr. Burn's life he did extensively discuss with his wife and 
his immediate family and specifically, his sister, the special administrator, Elizabeth Park, his desire 
for Gayle Burns to conceive a child by in vitro fertilization using his sperm and thus would leave his 
own child in this world by and with his wife, Gayle Burns. 
8. That Gayle Burns was seen by the Reproductive Center at the University of Utah and 
on or about May 3,2003 two embryos were transferred to Ms. Burns with one successfully taken, 
and subsequently, Ian M. Burns, the subject child of this petition, was born on December 23,2003. 
9. That on the original birth certificate as issued by the Utah Department of Health, 
Michael A. Burns was not listed as the natural father of Ian M. Burns. 
10. That Gayle Bums did petition the Utah Department of Health to amend the birth 
certificate and this was submitted to the Department on or about September 3,2004. 
11. That evidence in support of the amendment given to the Utah Department of Health, 
Division of Vital Records, included Michael A. Bums and Gayle Bums marriage certificate, Michael 
A. Bums Death Certificate and letters from the Reproductive Care Center and the Semen Storage 
Agreement from the University of Utah regarding the Semen Storage Agreement and subsequent in 
vitro fertilization and birth. 
12. That the Department of Health did issue an amended birth certificate listing Michael 
A. Bums as the birth father of Ian M. Bums on or about September 11, 2004. 
13. That in the months prior to Gayle Burns in vitro fertilization she was not seeing any 
other male person nor did she have sexual relations with any other male person. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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14. That Elizabeth Park, special administrator, and the family of Michael A. Bums, 
including grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, nephews and nieces, all openly recognize Ian M. 
Bums as their grandchild, nephew and cousin and the natural son of Michael A. Bums. 
15. That an Informal Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination of Heirs and 
Appointment of Special Administrator was submitted to the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or about February 15, 2008 and in said adjudication it was 
determined that the decedent, Michael A. Bums, died intestate, that his heirs were Gayle Bums and 
Ian M. Bums, and that Elizabeth Park was appointed special administrator of the estate. 
16. That Gayle Bums then filed this immediate action to establish paternity to obtain 
Social Security Survivor Benefits for her son, Ian M. Burns, as survivor of Michael A. Burns. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Venue and jurisdiction in this court are proper. 
2. That pursuant to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity UCA 78-45(A), et seq., 
petitioner needs to show by clear and convincing evidence that Ian M. Burns is the son of Michael 
A. Bums. 
3.. Testimony and evidence in the matter from Gayle Bums and Elizabeth Park establish 
the fact that Michael A. Bums did store his semen with the University of Utah in a cryo-preserved 
state with the intent to impregnate his wife, Gayle Bums, in the event he was rendered sterile by the 
treatment for Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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4. That eventually Ian M. Bums was conceived by cryo-preserved sperm of Michael A. 
Bums by In Vitro fertilization and such sperm was specifically stored for that purpose by Michael 
A. Bums. 
5. That the contract entered into by Michael A. Bums and the University of Utah did 
give care, custody and control of the semen to Gayle Bums for such fertilization purposes in the 
event of the death of Michael A. Burns. 
6. That Michael A. Bums did discuss and intend for Gayle Bums to use this semen for 
in vitro fertilization and such was discussed between and agreed to by Gayle Burns and Michael A. 
Bums. 
7. That the minor child, Ian M. Bums, has been recognized by Michael A. Bums family 
as the soil of Michael A. Bums in all respects and is openly acknowledged and recognized as the 
natural son of Michael A. Burns. 
8. That petitioner has met their burden of proof. 
9. That an appropriate Order consistent with these Findings indicating the paternity and 
all rights arising therefrom of Ian M. Bums by Michael A. Bums should be issued. 
DATED this ^ 5 ? d a y of April, 2008. " \ 
BY THE COUSraj MT£ n 
Third Distri 
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WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Holladay,UT84117 
Telephone: (801)277-4292 
Facsimile: (801)277-4295 
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Third Judicial District 
APR I 5 2008 
S^T LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF IAN M. BURNS, 
(DOB: 12/23/03) 
A Minor Child. 
ORDER 
Case No. 074904953 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn 
PURSUANT to the petition of Gayle M. Burns, natural parent and guardian of Ian M. Burns, 
a minor, in the matter having been regularly heard before this court on March 18,2008, petitioner, 
Gayle M. Burns, appearing by and through counsel, William R. Hadley, and Elizabeth Park, special 
administrator for the Estate of Michael A. Burns, appearing Pro Se, and the Court being familiar with 
the case and taken testimony, 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Michael A. Burns, deceased, is 
the natural father of Ian M. Burns, subject child of this matter, born on December 23,2003 in Salt 
• 40 
Lake County, Utah to his natural mother Gayle M. Burns. 
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That all rights arising from said parent/child relationship including those of care, custody, 
support and inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of Ian M. Burns, a minor. ^ 
DATED this __Z?day of April, 2008. 
BYTHEi 
HON 
Third 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT 
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D^ fUTY COURT CLERK 
Order 
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Date: August 22,2008 
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NOTICE OF DECISION - FULLY FAVORABLE 
I have made the enclosed decision in your case. Please read this notice and the decision 
carefully. 
This Decision is Fully Favorable To You 
Another office will process the decision and send you a letter about your benefits. Your local 
Social Security office or another may first ask you for more information. If you do not hear 
anything for 60 days, contact your local office. 
The Appeals Council May Review The Decision On Its Own 
The Appeals Council may decide to review my decision even though you do not ask it to do 
so. To do that, the Council must mail you a notice about its review within 60 days from the 
date shown above. Review at the Council's own motion could make the decision less 
favorable or unfavorable to you. 
If You Disagree With The Decision 
If you believe my decision is not fully favorable to you, or if you disagree with it for any 
reason, you may file an appeal with the Appeals Council. 
How to File an Appeal 
To file an appeal you or your representative must request that the Appeals Council review the 
decision. You must make the request in writing. You may use our Request for Review form, 
HA-520, or write a letter. 
You may file your request at any local Social Security office or a hearing office. You may 
also mail your request right to the Appeals Council, Office of Disability Adjudication and 
Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike. Falls Church, VA 22041-3255. Please put the Social Security 
number shown above on any appeal you file. 
Time to File an Appeal 
To file an appeal, you must file your request for review within 60 days from the date you get 
this notice. 
See Next Page 
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The Appeals Council assumes you got the notice 5 days after the date shown above unless 
you show you did not get it within the 5-day period. The Council will dismiss a late request 
unless you show you had a good reason for not filing it on time. 
Time to Submit New Evidence 
You should submit any new evidence you wish to the Appeals Council to consider with your 
request for review. 
How an Appeal Works 
Our regulations state the rules the Appeals Council applies to decide when and how to review 
a case. These rules appear in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 20, Chapter III, 
Part 404 (Subpart J). 
If you file an appeal, the Council will consider all of my decision, even the parts with which 
you agree. The Council may review your case for any reason. It will review your case if one 
of the reasons for review listed in our regulations exists. Section 404.970 of the regulations 
lists these reasons. 
Requesting review places the entire record of your case before the Council. Review can make 
any part of my decision more or less favorable or unfavorable to you. 
On review, the Council may itself consider the issues and decide your case. The Council may 
also send it back to an Administrative Law Judge for a new decision. 
If No Appeal and No Appeals Council Review 
If you do not appeal and the Council does not review my decision on its own motion, you will 
not have a right to court review. My decision will be a final decision that can be changed 
only under special rules. 
If You Have Any Questions 
If you have any questions, you may call, write or visit any Social Security office. If you visit 
an office, please bring this notice and decision with you. The telephone number of the local 
office that serves your area is (801) 268-1060. Its address is Social Security Administration, 
348 E. Winchester Street, Suite 100, Murray, UT 84107. 
Donald R. Jensen 
U.S. Administrative Law Judge 
cc: William R. Hadley, Esq. 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, #204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
Office of Disability Adjudication and Review 
DECISION 
IN THE CASE OF CLAIM FOR 
Ian M.Burns RSI 
(Claimant) 
XREF: 529-49-0701 
Michael A. Burns 646-74-5764 
(Wage Earner) (Social Security Number) 
Gayle Burns, as the biological mother, on behalf of the claimant, Ian Burns, applied for surviving 
dependent child benefits on September 1, 2005, alleging that the deceased wage earner, Michael 
Burns, was the claimant's father. After receiving unfavorable initial and reconsideration 
determinations, the claimant filed a timely request for a hearing on July 13, 2006. Pursuant to 
notice, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge was held in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
October 3,2007, The claimant's mother personally appeared and testified on behalf of the 
claimant, who was not present. The claimant was represented by William Hadley, an attorney. 
ISSUES 
At issue is whether the claimant is entitled to surviving child dependent insurance benefits on the 
earnings record of the wage earner, pursuant to Section 202(d) of the Social Security Act. 
Specifically, the undersigned must determine whether the claimant, Ian Burns, is the "child" of 
the insured wage earner, Michael Burns, as defined in §§216(e) and 216(h) of the Act. 
With respect to the claim for child's survivor benefits, there is an additional issue as to whether 
the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act are met. The insured's earnings record 
shows that he had acquired sufficient quarters of coverage to be insured at the time of his death. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Gayle Burns, the natural mother of the claimant, and Michael Burns, the insured wage earner, 
were married on August 24, 1997. Exhibit 11, page 4. A little less than two years later, around 
April 20,1999, the insured was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. His physician gave 
him about a 95% chance of survival and the insured agreed to undergo chemotherapy and 
radiation treatmentfor his condition. Because one of the potential side effects of these treatments 
is sterility, the insured and the claimant's mother decided that the insured would bank his sperm, 
so that the couple would be able to have children at a later time. In contemplation of these 
actions, the insured entered into a Semen Storage Agreement with the University of Utah 
Reproductive Center on May 30,2000. The agreement provided, in pertinent part, that in the 
event of the death of the insured, his sperm should be legally transferred to his wife, the 
claimant's mother. Exhibit 11, pages 5-8. The insured and the claimant's mother discussed the 
issue and the insured expressed his desire to the claimant's mother that she use the stored semen 
to have a child in the future by artificial methods, if the insured became sterile as a consequence 
See Next Page 
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of the cancer treatments. The insured's condition worsened and he died on March 24,2001. 
Exhibit 11, page 9; Exhibit 20. 
During the month immediately preceding his death, the insured had discussions with his 
immediate family, including his wife and his sister, who became the special administrator of his 
estate. In these discussions, the insured expressed his desire that the claimant's mother conceive 
a child by in vitro fertilization, using his sperm. In this way, he would be able to have a child 
with his wife and his child would survive him. Following the death of her husband, the 
claimant's mother worked with a fertility clinic to undergo fertility treatments. The 
Reproductive Care Center used sperm from the insured, provided to them by the University of 
Utah sperm bank, to inseminate the eggs of the claimant's mother. Two embryos were 
transferred to the claimant's mother on May 3,2003, and the claimant's mother successfully 
delivered him on December 23, 2003, approximately four weeks prior to her predicted due date 
and consistent with the pregnancy being the result of the artificial insemination with the 
insured's sperm. Exhibit 1, pages 10-13; Exhibit 20. 
Following the claimant's birth, he was issued a Utah Birth Certificate showing that he was the 
natural child of the mother. Exhibit 11, page 15. Although no father was listed initially, the 
Health Department was provided an affidavit and supporting documentation so that a corrected 
birth certificate could be issued, showing the insured to be the child's natural father. The 
affidavit was signed by both the claimant's mother and by the insured's mother. Exhibit 11, 
pages 14,16. A corrected birth certificate was issued by the State of Utah, showing that the 
claimant was the natural child of the mother and the insured. Exhibit 11, page 17. The insured's 
family, including his sister, mother and father, other siblings, and their children, all openly 
recognize that the claimant is the natural son of the insured. An Informal Petition for 
Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination of Heirs, and Appointment of Special Administrator 
was submitted to the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
February 15,2008. In that proceeding, it was determined that the insured died intestate and that 
his heirs were the claimant and his mother. The mother also filed an action to establish paternity. 
Pursuant to the Utah Uniform Act on Paternity, UCA §§78-45(A), et seq., the insured was 
adjudged to be the natural father of the claimant. Exhibit 20. 
The claimant's mother filed an application for benefits on behalf of the claimant, as the surviving 
child of the insured, on September 1,2005. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Under the Social Security Act, the unmarried minor "child" of a deceased individual who was 
insured under the Act may receive survivors' benefits if the child has filed an application for 
benefits and was "dependent upon such individual" prior to his death. 42 USC §202(d)(l). 
Section 216(e) of the Social Security Act provides that the term "child" means the child or 
legally adopted child of an individual. 
A child is considered dependent for purposes of this statute if the insured father was living with 
or contributing to the child's support at the time of death. Certain children, however, are relieved 
of the burden of proving actual dependency, and the law presumes them to be dependent on the 
deceased wage earner. Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child who 
See Next Page 
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is. (A) the legitimate offspring or (B) a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property 
from the insured parent's estate under the applicable state intestacy law is deemed dependent as 
of the time of the parent's death. If such a relationship is lacking under state law, unless the child 
has been adopted by some other individual, (C) he or she is entitled to a presumption of 
dependency if the decedent, prior to their death, (1) went through a marriage ceremony with the 
other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious legal 
defect, would have been valid; or (2) acknowledged in writing that the child was his; or (3) was 
decreed by a court to be the child's father; or (4) was ordered by a court to support the child 
because the child was his. 42 USC §416(d)-(h). 
The regulations parallel the language in the Act. Section 20 CFR 404.355 of the Social Security 
Regulations provides that a child is deemed to be the eligible natural child of the insured wage 
earner if he or she (1) could inherit the insured's personal property as ids natural child under state 
inheritance laws that would be applied if the insured died without leaving a will; (2) is the 
insured's natural child and the insured and the child's mother went through a ceremony that 
would have resulted in a valid marriage between them except for a "legal impediment" as 
described in the Regulations; (3) is the insured's natural child and the mother did not marry the 
insured, but the insured either acknowledged in writing that the child was his, was decreed by a 
court to be the child's father, or was ordered by a court to contribute to the child's support 
because the child was his. The Regulation further provides that, if the insured is deceased, the 
acknowledgment, court decree, or court order must have been issued before the insured's death. 
(4) If the child's mother had not married the insured, but the child has evidence other than the 
evidence provided for in (3), above, to show that the insured is the natural father of the child, the 
child must also have evidence to show that the insured was either living with the child or was 
contributing to the child's support at the time the child applied for benefits or at the time of the 
insured's death. If the applicable state inheritance law would require a court determination of 
paternity, the Administration does not require that such a court determination be obtained, but 
applies the standard of proof the state would apply in determining paternity. 
Because the insured was a resident of and was domiciled in Utah at the time of his death, Utah 
law is the applicable state law. Under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, a "child" includes any 
individual entitled to take as a child under the Uniform Probate Code by intestate succession 
from the parent whose relationship is involved and specifically excludes only "any person who is 
only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant." UCA §75-1-
201(5). To "survive" the insured within the meaning of the Uniform Probate Code, the child 
must not have predeceased the insured, but must have lived for at least 120 hours after the 
insured's death or for 120 hours after the birth of the child if the child is in gestation, whichever 
comes last. UCA §§75-1-201(50), 75-2-104, 75-2-108, 75-2-702. For heirs other than a 
surviving spouse, the Code provides that "any part of the intestate estate not passing to the 
decedent's surviving spouse, or the entire estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes "to the 
decedent's descendents/w capita at each generation as defined in Subsection 75-2-106(2)." 
Under §75-2-106(2), the intestate estate would first go to the surviving spouse. If there were no 
such eligible spouse surviving the decedent, then the estate would be distributed in per capita, or 
equal, shares to the decedent's children. If a child did not survive the decedent, then that child's 
shares would go to the child's children, and so forth. 
See Next Page 
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Utah does not discriminate between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children. Under UCA §75-2-
114(1), [e]xcept as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), for purposes of intestate succession by, 
through, or from a person, an individual is the child of the individual's natural parents, regardless 
of their marital status. The parent and child relationship may be established as provided in 
Sections 78-45a-7, 78-45a-10, and Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity." Subsections 
(2) and (3) contain provisions regarding adopted children and inheritance from or through a child 
by the parent, neither of which apply in the present case. See also §78-45g-202, which provides 
that a child born to parents who are not married to one another, but whose paternity is 
determined under the provisions of Chapter 45g has the same rights under the law as a child who 
is born to parents who are married to each other. 
In addition, the Uniform Probate Code at UCA §75-1-102 contains the following guidance 
regarding construction of its provisions: 
(1) This code shall be liberally constructed and applied to promote its underlying 
purpose and policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are: 
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, 
missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated persons; 
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of 
his property; 
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the estate of 
the decedent and making distribution to his successors; 
(d) To facilitate use and enforcement of certain trusts; and 
(e) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
The Uniform Act on Paternity was enacted primarily to provide for support of children and 
payment of birth expenses, regardless of whether the child was born within or outside of a 
marriage. §78-45a-l, Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). Under this Act, paternity 
may be determined by petition for adjudication by certain persons or entities, or by voluntary 
declaration of paternity meeting certain technical requirements. §78-45a-1, et seq. 
The parent/child relationship in Utah is also subject to the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, §§78-
45g, et seq. "Unless parental right are terminated, a parent/child relationship established under 
this chapter applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided by other law of 
this state." UCA §78-45g-203 (amended and renumbered in 2008 to §78B-15-203). 
The father/child relationship is established between a man and a child by: (a) an unrebutted 
presumption of the man's paternity of the child under Section 78-45g-204 (now §78B-15-204); 
(b) an effective declaration of paternity by the man under Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of 
Paternity, unless the declaration has been rescinded or successfully challenged; (c) an 
adjudication of the man's paternity; (d) adoption of the child by the man; (e) the man having 
consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7, Assisted Reproduction, which 
resulted in the birth of the child; or'(f)- an adjudication confirming the man as a parent of a child 
born to a gestational (i.e., surrogate) mother if the agreement was validated under Part 8, 
Gestational Agreement, or is enforceable under other law. UCA §78-45g-201 (now §78B-15-
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201). [References hereafter will be to the numbering system and statutory language of Chapter 
45g in force at the time of the death of the insured and of the child's application.] 
Under §78-45g-204, a man is presumed to be the father of a child if (a) he and the mother are 
married to each other and the child is born during the marriage; (b) he and the mother were 
married to each other and the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by 
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation; (c) before 
the birth of the child, he and the child's mother married each other in apparent compliance with 
the law, even if the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born during the 
possibly invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination; (d) if the mother and the father 
are married after the child's birth, he voluntarily asserted his paternity, and there is no other 
presumptive father, assuming certain other conditions are also met. If a husband provides sperm 
for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by his wife as provided in §78-45g-704, then he is the 
father of a resulting child born to his wife. §78-45g-703. If there is a consent to assisted 
reproduction, it must be in a record signed by the husband and wife, but failure of the husband to 
sign does not preclude finding the husband to be the child's father if husband and wife openly 
treat the child as their own. §78-45g-704. If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or 
an embryo, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse 
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse 
would be a parent of the child. §78^45g-707. 
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
The wage earner, Michael, died fully insured. As is noted above, there is no dispute that the 
claimant is the natural child of the insured and the mother. He has not been adopted by any other 
persofi. An application was filed on behalf of the claimant, who is an unmarried minor child, 
now four years of age. Therefore, all other requirements being met, the inquiry centers on 
whether the claimant was actually or was presumed to be dependent upon the insured under the 
applicable statutory and regulatory provisions. 
I. The evidence supports finding that the claimant is presumptively entitled to benefits. 
There are several alternative rationales for presuming the child to be the dependent of the 
insured. As they apply to the claimant, they are discussed below in the order in which they 
appear in the Act: 
(A) The claimant is the''legitimate" offspring of the deceased insured. 
Utah no longer recognizes a statutory distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" 
offspring. Under UCA §75-2-114(1), [e]xcept as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), for 
purposes of intestate succession by, through, or from a person, an individual is the child of the 
individual's natural parents, regardless of their marital status. See also §78-45g-202, which 
provides that a child born to parents who are not married to one another, but whose paternity is 
determined under the provisions of chapter 45g has the same rights under the law as a child who 
is born to parents who are married to each other. 
Although the claimant was not born during the marriage or within 300 days of his father's death 
(§78-45g-204 (a)-(c)), under UCA §78-45g-703, Utah's Uniform Act on Paternity provides that, 
See Next Page 
Ian M. Burns (646-74-5764) Page 6 of 12 
"[i]f a husband provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by his wife as provided 
in Section 78-45g-704, he is the father of a resulting child born to his wife." If a spouse dies 
before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the 
resulting child Unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction 
were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child. §78-45g-707. 
In the present instance, the insured provided sperm for the purpose of assisted reproduction by 
his wife in the event he became unable to produce viable sperm following his cancer treatments. 
In addition, there is a Semen Storage Agreement with the University of Utah Reproductive 
Center signed on May 30,2000 by the insured and his wife that satisfies this requirement. The 
Semen Storage Agreement does not contain the specific language of parentage, but contains 
language indicating that, in the event of the insured's death, he wished his semen to be 
maintained in storage for future donation to his wife, the claimant's mother. It is logical that this 
was understood by the insured to iiiean that he recognized and agreed that he would be the father 
of the resulting child. There is parole evidence clarifying the understanding and intent of the 
insured and his wife, including the testimony of the wife under oath and the testimony of the 
insured's family members. The State of Utah also recognized this father-child relationship in 
issuing a birth certificate identifying the insured as the claimant's father, based upon the evidence 
presented to the issuing agency. Exhibit 11, pages 15-18. 
There is no dispute that the claimant is the natural child of the deceased insured wage earner and 
the mother. Therefore, the claimant is the "legitimate offspring" of the insured and is entitled to 
benefits on this basis. 42 USC §416(e). Even if there were some question as to the applicability 
or satisfaction of this provision, the claimant would be entitled to survivor's benefits under 
additional provisions of the Act. 
(B) The claimant is a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured's 
estate under Utah intestacy law. 
Section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act says that a claimant shall be considered a "child" 
for the purpose of entitlement if he or she would be entitled to inherit personal property from the 
insured person under the law of intestate succession of the State where the insured person had his 
true fixed and permanent home at the time the application is filed (if the insured is living) or at 
the time of the insured's death. "Laws of intestate succession" describe how property is to be 
distributed when a person dies without leaving a will. 
For heirs other than a surviving spouse, the Utah Uniform Probate Code provides that "any part 
of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving spouse, or the entire estate if there 
is no surviving spouse, passes "to the decedent's descendents^er capita at each generation as 
defined in Subsection 75-2-106(2)." Under §75-2-106(2), if there were no eligible spouse 
surviving the decedent, then the estate would be distributed in equal shares to the decedent's 
children. Under UCA §75-2-114(1), an individual is the child of their natural parents, regardless 
of the parents' marital status. Tie undersigned also notes that the old requirement of intestacy 
laws that an heir be a "life inbeing" at the time of the decedent's death no longer exists in Utah, 
nor does it appear in other jurisdictions that have adopted the modern Uniform Probate Code. 
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The father/child relationship between the claimant and the insured is established by all of the 
following alternative methods provided for by Utah law: (a) an unrebutted presumption of the 
man's paternity of the child under Section 78-45g-204; (c) an adjudication of the insured's 
paternity; (e) the insured having consented to assisted reproduction by his wife, which resulted in 
the birth of the child. 
Under the applicable provisions of §78-45g-204 and -703, the insured is presumed to be the 
father of the claimant, who was born to the insured's wife, because the insured, as a husband, 
provided sperm for, and consented to, assisted reproduction by his wife as provided in §78-45g-
704. It is undisputed that the insured provided the sperm for assisted reproduction by his wife, 
who gave birth to the claimant following such assisted reproduction, following implantation of 
embryos created using the decedent's sperm. The record documents the procedures that were 
followed by the respective clinics. In addition, there is an agreement documenting the insured's 
consent, and it is in a written document signed by the insured and his wife before the insured's 
death. This application of Utah intestacy law is consistent with the evidence we have concerning 
the insured's intent. In addition, although occurring after th^ death of the insured, the Utah State 
court issued an adjudication of paternity. Exhibit 20. 
The New Jersey Superior Court addressed similar issues in In re Estate ofKolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 
(N.J. Sujter.Ct. 2000), a case involving a plaintiff who sought a declaration from the court that 
her posthumously implanted twins were eligible for benefits under the Act. In that case, the 
plaintiffs husband died of leukemia after having stored sperm so that his wife would be able to 
have his children. The plaintiff was implanted with the embryos about a year after her husband's 
death, and subsequently gave birth to twin daughters. The husband had expressed his desire that 
the plaintiff use his sperm to conceive children after his death. Therefore, the New Jersey court 
held that the children were the legal heirs of the deceased under state law, and recognized that 
this status would impact their eligibility for benefits under the Act. To similar effect, see 
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 2002). 
Under the provisions of the intestacy laws of the State of Utah, the claimant would be eligible to 
inherit from his father, the insured. He would also, therefore, be entitled to receive survivor's 
benefits under the Act. "Applicants who according to such law would have the same status 
relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such." 42 USC 
§416(h)(2)(A). 
(C) The claimant is entitled to a presumption of dependency under the alternatives to a 
determination under State intestacy provisions. 
Even if the claimant were not eligible to inherit under the applicable State intestacy laws, he is 
entitled to a presumption of dependency because the decedent, prior to his death, entered into a 
valid marriage with the claimant's mother. 42 USC §416(h)(2)(B). There may be some question 
as to whether a child who is conceived after the death of one of the parents is, in fact, a child of 
the marriage, because of the presumptive termination of the marriage at the death of one of the 
spouses. However, Utah law has specifically recognized that such children are, in fact, children 
of that marriage. Cf §§78-45g-204,78-45g-703,78-45g-704,78-45g-707. 
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With respect to the second alternative to the intestacy determination, that the insured 
acknowledge in writing that the child was his, there is an indication that the insured did make 
such a written acknowledgment, albeit indirectly, prior to his death. 42 USC §416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I). 
Although the claimant was not yet conceived, the insured acknowledged that he had donated 
sperm in order that his wife should be able to bear his child in the event that he became sterile as 
a consequence of the cancer treatments he was to undergo. It would logically follow that the 
decedent also acknowledged that any resulting child would be his. Any other result would be 
biologically, and logically, impossible. Apparently the State of Utah agreed, because it issued a 
birth certificate naming the decedent insured as the claimant's father. Exhibit 11, pages 15-18. 
With respect to the third alternative, there is a court decree of paternity finding that the claimant 
is the natural child of the insured. Exhibit 20. Although this does meet the requirements for 
determination of paternity under Utah law, the decree does not meet the additional requirement 
of the Act (42 USC §416(h)(3)(C)(i)(II)), andthe Regulations (20 CFR §404.355), because the 
decree was issued after the insured's death, and not before. 
The fourth option does not apply here, because there has been no such child support order. 
The claimant is entitled to receive survivor's benefits under 42 USC §416(h)(2)(B) and 42 USC 
§416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I): 
II. Payment of benefits is consistent with existing Administration precedent and policy. 
In Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), the Administration addressed the question as to whether a child 
conceived by artificial means after the death of the insured is a "child" for purposes of the receipt 
of child's benefits under §202(d)(l) of the Social Security Act. The Ninth Circuit decided the 
case ofGilletuNettingy.Barrihart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2001), reh 'g denied (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 
2004), giving rise to the Acquiescence Ruling. Although the Ruling is limited in applicability to 
determinations or decisions within the Ninth Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the Northern Mariana Islands), the Ruling 
and the underlying case are instructive. 
The facts of Gillette-Netting are similar to the facts in the present case. On August 19,1996, 
Rhonda Gillette-Netting filed applications for child's insurance benefits on behalf of her twin 
children as survivors of the insured, Robert Netting. The twins were born 18 months after the 
death of the insured. They were conceived by in yitro fertilization using sperm that the insured 
had frozen and stored before he died. The Social Security Administration denied the claims, 
finding that the twins did not meet the statutory definition of "child" and that neither twin was 
dependent upon their father at the time of his death, as required by the Act. The United States 
District Court for the District of Arizona affirmed the Administration's denial of benefits. After 
the District Court denied a motion for reconsideration, the twins' mother filed an appeal with the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
decision of the district court and held that the twins were entitled to benefits because, as the 
biological children of the insured, they met the statutory definition of "child." The court held 
that §216(h)(2), (3) of the Act did not apply in that case, and, therefore, there was no need to 
consult the law of intestate succession for Arizona. The court reasoned that the twins were 
deemed dependent upon the insured under §202(d)(3) of the Act, because under Arizona law, 
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they were the "legitimate" children of the insured. Under Arizona law, "[e]very child is the 
legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful 
wedlock." Ariz. Rev. Stat. §8-601 (1975). Because the insured was married to the mother of the 
twins and was the biological father of the twins, the twins were legitimate under State law. 
The Administration interprets the Act to require that an after-conceived child must be able to 
inherit under State law in order to meet the statutory definition of a "child" under the Act. In 
addition, the child must also show that he or she was "dependent upon" the insured at the time of 
the insured's death. Under §202(d)(3), a "legitimate" child is "deemed dependent" upon the 
insured at the time of their death, unless the child was adopted by someone else. The Ninth 
Circuit found that the twins established "child" status under the Act solely based upon being the 
biological children of the insured, and that §216(h) did not apply unless the child's parentage was 
disputed. The court also found that, under Arizona law, an insured individual's biological child 
conceived by artificial means after the death of the insured would be considered "natural" if the 
parents were married at the time of the insured's death. The Administration stated that in a claim 
for survivor's benefits in the Ninth Circuit, the biological child of an insured individual 
conceived by artificial means after the death of the insured would be considered the insured's 
"child" for purposes of the Act, and §216(h) would not be applied. In addition, if such child 
were considered "legitimate" under State law, the Administration would consider the child to be 
the "legitimate" child of the insured and thus deemed dependent upon the insured for purposes of 
§202(d)(3). All of the States and jurisdictions in the Ninth Circuit, with the exception of Guam, 
had eliminated distinctions between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children, and allowed all 
children the same rights between parents and children without regard for the parents' marital 
status. Therefore, if all other requirements are met, the Administration would consider such a 
child to be entitled to child's benefits under §202(d). AR 05-1(9). 
Finally, the Administration amended its policy manual in 1998 to set forth its internal policy 
determination that a child conceived by artificial means after the death of the insured wage 
earner cannot be entitled to survivor's benefits under 42 USC §416(h)(3), but such a child can be 
entitled to benefits under 42 USC §416(h)(2)(A). POMS §GN 00306.001C.C. (The Program 
Operations Manual System, or POMS, is the set of internal operating instructions used by 
Administration field personnel in processing applications for benefits.) Thus, Administration 
policy and precedent are in accord with the determination to allow benefits in the present case. 
The Regional Chief Counsel opinion that was provided in this matter was issued before the 
effective publication date of the Acquiescence ruling discussed above, and therefore omitted 
consideration of recent Administration policy, for example. Therefore, the undersigned has 
considered that opinion, but has updated and reconsidered the law and its application. 
III. Payment of benefits in the present case is consistent with the statutory purpose of the Act 
The Act was not intended merely to replace actual support that a child was receiving and then 
lost through the death of the insured parent. Instead, the statute was designed to replace 
obligations of support or potential support lost through the death of the insured parent. Children 
in the presumptive groups may be statutorily entitled to benefits, even if they have never been 
actually dependent upon the father through whom they claim. S.Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 110 (1965). 
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[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of legitimate children are 
actually dependent upon their parents for support. Likewise,... the children of an invalid 
marriage ... would typically live in the wage earner's home or be supported by him... When 
an order of support is entered by a court it is reasonable to assume compliance occurred. A 
paternity decree, while not necessarily ordering support, would almost as strongly suggest 
support was subsequently obtained. Conceding that a written acknowledgment lacks the 
imprimatur of a judicial proceeding, it too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. 
Men do not customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an illegitimate child unless 
the child is theirs and a man who has acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it 
support than one who does not. 
Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F.Supp. 1117,1128 (Md. 1973). 
The Social Security insurance programs have been participatory from the outset; benefits have 
not been extended to persons without at least a close relationship to the individual who paid into 
the system during his or her working life. However, Congress did not create and amend the Act 
with the idea that it was fulfilling any narrow contractual obligation owed to the program 
participant. To the contrary, Congress has continually increased the amount of benefits paid and 
has expanded the pool of eligible recipients by singling out additional, identifiable groups having 
both the requisite relationship to the contributing worker and a degree of probable need which, in 
the judgment of the legislature, justifies assistance. 
As originally enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act provided for benefits only to the wage 
earner. In 1939, additional provisions were made for benefits to the wage earner's family, 
including wives and widows and subsequently adding husbands and widowers in 1950. 
Subsequent amendments have changed the statute in the direction of expanded coverage, the 
United States Supreme Court has noted, but the basic scheme of coverage has remained 
unchanged. Children have been covered by the Act, including children of deceased wage earners 
for whom the loss of the parent is an immediate source of financial need. Califano v. Goldfarb, 
430 U.S. 199 (1977). The House Committee Report described widows over the age of 65, 
widows with children, orphans, and dependent parents over the age of 65 (to whom the 1939 
amendments extended benefits) as being the "groups of survivors whose probable need is 
greatest." H.R.Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1939). 
With respect to children of a deceased wage earner, the Supreme Court stated that 
Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency was obviously 
to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was unwilling to assume that every 
child of a deceased insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming dependency 
on the basis of relatively readily documented facts, such as legitimate birth, or existence 
of a support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate the 
likelihood of continued actual dependency. Congress was able to avoid the burden and 
expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large number of cases where 
dependency is objectively probable. 
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Matthews v. Lucas, All U.S. 495, 508-09 (1976). The same reasoning should control in the 
present case. Title II is a program of mandatory wage deductions that was designed to ensure 
that a worker's dependents would have some income in the event of the worker's retirement, 
death, or disability. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282,283 (1979)(Title II "attempts to obviate, 
through a program of forced savings, the economic dislocations that may otherwise accompany 
old age, disability, or the death of a breadwinner.") The worker is legally compelled to set aside 
a portion of his wages in order to earn benefits to provide for his dependent children in the event 
he becomes unable to do so himself. The sole and express purpose of Title II children's benefits 
is to support dependent children. Matthews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181,185-86, and n. 6 (1976); 
Matthews v, Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974). 
The undersigned is cognizant that there are competing considerations. On the one hand, the Act 
and its underlying purposes support the grant of benefits to the claimant. On the other hand, the 
undersigned has an obligation to the Social Security trust fund and to the taxpayers paying into 
that fund. The undersigned finds that payment of benefits in this case is not only in accordance 
with the law, but does not pose an unacceptable risk of significant depletion of the trust fund. 
The purpose of the statutory scheme has consistently been described as intending to provide 
support for the dependents of a wage earner who has lost his or her earning power through 
disability, old age, or death. The Act was expanded to include "illegitimate" children who could 
provide some indicia of their dependency, whether by a status that gave them presumptive 
dependency or by proof of actual dependency. 
Similarly, to include after-conceived children who are able to provide some indicia of parentage 
in accordance with the provisions of the Act and applicable State law does not risk "over 
inclusion" to the detriment of the trust fund. According to one estimate, about 60,000 births 
occurred each year in the United States as the result of artificial insemination1. Certainly not all 
of these would be posthumously conceived children seeking survivor's benefits. Minor children 
of deceased workers who are receiving survivor's benefits have been in the range of 54% to 56% 
of the "orphan population" since 1997, and the rate has been falling steadily since at least 19802, 
despite the increase in conception by artificial means. Further, projections for Title II needs are 
based upon actuarial assumptions, including projected fertility rates for women, without regard 
for how, when or why they conceive during their child-bearing years. Therefore, the undersigned 
finds that the inclusion of after-conceived children who meet statutory requirements as set forth 
above will not impose an unnecessary or unreasonable burden on the Social Security trust fund. 
DECISION 
It is the decision of the Administrative Law Judge that the claimant, Ian Burns, born December 
23, 2003, is entitled to surviving dependent child's benefits pursuant to 42 USC §§202, et seq. 
and 20 CFR §§404.535 based upon on the earnings record of the insured wage earner, Michael 
Burns, beginning from the date of claimant's birth. 
1
 U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003 Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Report. 
2
 "Short-Range Actuarial Projections of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Program, 2005," Actuarial 
Study No. 119, Social Security Administration. 
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The Administrative Law Judge recommends that the claimant's mother, Gayle Bums, be 
appointed as the minor child's (claimant's) representative payee. 
Donald R. Jensen 
U.S. Administrative Law Judge 
August 22, 2008 
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(The following is a transcript in the hearing held before 
Donald Jenson, Administrative Law Judge, Office of Hearings and 
Appeals, Social Security Administration, on October 3, 2007, at 
Salt Lake City, Utah, in the case of Gayle Burnes, Social Security 
Number 646-74-5764. The claimant appeared in person and was 
represented by William Hadley, Attorney. Also present was 
Elizabeth Park, Witness) 
(The hearing commenced at 2:00 p.m., on October 3, 2007.) 
OPENING STATEMENT BY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
ALJ: The hearing in the case of Gayle Burnes, a claimant for 
Social Security survivor's benefits, mother's benefits on the account 
of wage earner Michael A. Burnes, 529-49-0701. And the case of 
Ian Burnes, a claimant for survivor's benefits, child's benefits on 
the claim of the same wage earner, Michael A. Burnes are now both open 
at 2:02 p.m. The hearing is being held in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
Wednesday, October 3, 2007. The claimant, Gayle Burnes, is present at 
the hearing represented by counsel, Attorney William Hadley. The 
child, Ian Burnes, being a minor and quite young at that is not a 
necessary witness at this hearing. There being nothing he could 
provide and is not present. He is, however, represented by the same, 
William Hadley. How would you have me address you, Ms. or Mrs. 
Burnes? 
CLMT: Mrs. Burnes. 
ALJ: Mrs. Mrs. Burnes, my name is Donald Jenson, I'm an 
Administrative Law Judge with Social Security, and your case is 
assigned to me for a hearing. Now a Social Security hearing is quite 
simple, the rules of evidence and procedure you see in the courts 
don't all apply in this kind of administrative hearing. However, 
while testifying today you and any other witness will be under oath 
and the proceedings are all being recorded. We'll proceed today by my 
asking you questions first. After my questions for you your attorney 
. ?-29 
27 
ALJ: But 30 days ought to be sufficient, if it's not, I know 
things come up, things do happen, ask for more. 
ATTY: Okay. 
ALJ: Most reasonable requests are always granted. They're 
usually almost always usually. Okay. Anything else by way of 
opening? 
ATTY: No. Should I proceed with the examination --. 
ALJ: Examination of your --do you want to do the primary 
examination and me ask follow-up questions or do you want me to do.-.--. .. 
ATTY: Go ahead. I think you probably --" 
ALJ: I know how to do it in a disability case. I do thousands 
of them, well, 500 times 12, I do 600, 50 times 12, I do 600 a year 
approximately, so I know how to do the examination in disability 
claims. I'm not sure I know where I'm going on asking questions here. 
But let me just ask here. Just some background stuff, information. 
(The Claimant, GAYLE BURNS, having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows-.) 
EXAMINATION OF CLAIMANT BY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 
Q Mrs. Burns, I have your address as 11074 South Schilling 
Avenue, Number 1405 in South Jordan, is that still correct? 
A That's not correct. 
Q You have a new address? 
A I do. 
Q What is your new.address? 
A It's 738 Gables, G-A-B-L-E-S, Street, Midvale, Utah 84047. 
Q Do you have a new phone number as well? 
28 
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A No, the phone number is still the same. 
Q 516-2584? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Let me change that on both of these files here. Now, 
there is a factual issue here whether or not Ian is the child of 
Michael here. We have documentation that in vitro fertilization, 
sperm storage and in vitro fertilization was undergone. That does not 
of necessity mean that it is -- that Ian's birth is the result of that 
in vitro fertilization. Were you seeing anyone else at the time that 
Ian was conceived? 
A I was not. 
Q Had you been seeing anyone else within the prior year before 
that? 
A No, I have not. 
Q So you're not engaged in sexual relationships with anyone 
else, there's no possible other person who could have inseminated you? 
A No. 
Q Nor within the previous year? 
A No. 
Q Had you and your husband had any other children before Ian was 
conceived? 
A No, we had not. 
Q Have you had any other pregnancies before this time? 
A No, I have not. 
Q Or since then? 
A No. 
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Q And you are currently single? 
A I am. ;• _ . . 
Q Have you married anyone since your husband's death? 
A I have not. 
Q Has genetic testing been done to establish genetically that 
Ian is the child of Michael? 
A It has not. 
Q At the time that the semen sample was obtained, Michael was 
about to undergo radiation therapy for the cancer. Where was the 
cancer? 
A He had Non Hodgkins Lymphoma and he had a tumor behind his 
sternum. 
Q So Non Hodgkins. 
A Lymphoma. 
Q Uh-huh. And there was a tumor mass? 
A There was. 
Q Where? 
A Behind his sternum. 
Q When the Non Hodgkins Lymphoma and tumor mass was diagnosed, 
what prognosis were you and he given of his survivability? 
A He was given excellent chance, he was given about a 95 percent 
chance of survival. But the chemotherapy and radiation treatments was 
most definitely going to leave him sterile was what the doctor told 
us. 
Q Both the chemo and radiation? 
A Correct. 
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Q To the best of your recollection, at the time that this semen 
sample was taken, had you or he discussed the possibility that he 
would not survive the chemo and radiation, that he would die and 
whether or not he wanted to leave you with a child that he was not 
going to be able to support? 
A We hadn't discussed it until we actually signed this agreement 
where he had to notate what happened what happened if he did die, what 
he wanted. And before we signed the agreement we went home that night 
and had a discussion about if he did pass away he wanted the sperm to 
go to me so that a piece of him would be -- a piece of him and I would 
be on the earth. He wanted me to have his kids. 
Q So you did not sign that immediately when they presented you 
with that option? 
A No, we didn't. 
Q Were you there with him when it was first presented to him, 
that question? 
A I was, yes. . 
Q And the two of you wanted to go home and talk about it? 
A We did. Because of his survival rate, the 95 percent we 
hadn't really even considered him not surviving, so that's the matter 
of discussion that night. 
Q And he decided he wanted a piece of him -- see, there are two 
competing interests here, a piece of me going on or he's saddling you 
with a burden that I can't help you support, two competing interests 
going on here — • . 
A Right. 
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Q - that need to be resolved. And he resolved that to the best 
of your recollection here, and I know you're not a disinterested party 
•here. • 
A Right. 
Q To this conversation. To the best of your recollection he 
said that he wanted a piece of him to go on even if he should die 
before the child was conceived? . 
A He did. He wanted a child of his on the earth. 
Q The next day he signed that? 
A He did. The next day he went in to do the deposit. 
Q Do you have a copy of that agreement in front of you? 
A I do. 
Q Would you open that up, please. 
A Sure. 
Q Page, it's Exhibit 6 in my file here, there is on the last 
page of that a scribble on the first line, donor's signature. Is that 
your husband's signature? 
A That is. He was practicing to be a doctor. 
Q Do you have anything else that would have his signature on it 
that I could compare to that? 
A I do. I have our marriage, the ceremonial license that they 
gfive you when you get married. 
Q You have that with you? 
A I do. 
Q Okay. I would like to see something to compare that with. 
Nobody could read my signature either. 
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A He was quite proud of his signature actually. 
Q I think I always wanted to be a doctor. 
A He did too. 
Q Do you have that there? Oh, my apologies, I didn't see you 
pass that up here. I'm no handwriting expert, but this signature on 
this form here just has three initials, M-A-B or M-A something, maybe 
a B, it looks close to the way he made the B on Burns. He didn't 
write out Burns. It easily could be his signature. I'll accept it, 
okay. Thank you. Likewise his initials on page 3 of this agreement 
here, that would be M^B? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. All right. Has Michael's family accepted Ian as a 
grandchild? 
A They have. Michael's mother is constantly telling me how much 
Ian is like Mike growing up. 
Q Was anybody else party to this conversation with you and your 
husband when he decided that if he should die he would want you to 
conceive a child from his semen? 
A No human being, just our cats. 
Q Okay. Nobody else witnessed him. 
A Nobody else, no. It was, however, brought up between friends. 
Michael was very open about his treatment and he was telling our 
friends about the treatment and that he had to store his semen and 
they -- it was a very emotional night about dealing with the fact that 
he could die. 
Q Not too many of us have to deal with that issue. 
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A Not at 25. 
Q It just happens. Well, even at 85 you're still thinking 
you're going to be there for the next year. 
A That's true. 
Q I'm not 85 yet. 
A That's true. 
Q It's still a surprise when it comes. 
A Oh, yes. 
ALJ: For most of us anyway. All right, Counsel. 
ATTY: Just a few follow-up questions, Your Honor. 
EXAMINATION OF CLAIMANT BY ATTORNEY: 
Q You indicated that nobody else really heard the conversation 
about him wanting to have a child with you at --
ALJ: Well my only -- was that conversation that night when she 
said that he made that decision. No one else was party to that 
decision making process going on here. He may well have expressed it 
to other people after that, I didn't get into that. 
ATTY: Okay. 
BY ATTORNEY: 
Q Any of the physicians that you and Michael went to and talked 
about this, who were they? 
A There was his treating doctor, Dr. Martha Glen and the doctor, 
I think his name was Carrell over at the urology department at the 
university. 
ALJ: Doctors who? 
CLMT: Glen and Carrell, C-A, I think, R-E-L-L, is that. 
,'23ft 
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ATTY: OA-R-R-E-L-L. That's part of Exhibit 6, Your Honor. 
ALJ: Okay. 
BY ATTORNEY: . 
Q And Ian signed this on May 30, 2000 and he passed away on 
March 24, 2001. When did he actually get worse where he started 
discussing this? 
A He went through two rounds of chemo and we had to go through a 
bone marrow transplant and at that point his chances were 50/50 and we 
had to discuss more of what was going to happen if he passed away. 
Q When approximately was that? 
A That was, let's see, he went for bone marrow of 2000, December 
of 2000, toward the end. 
Q Did either of you think about going back and looking at this 
contract and making any changes on it that would indicate that the 
saved sperm would be being used for artificial insemination? 
A I don't think we thought about the agreement at that time 
because it was quite a trying time for us. I think what we as lay 
people had thought of as the agreement was that it would have taken 
care of it because we didn't see any reason not to think it would. 
Q So it was you and Michael's understanding that if he passed 
away the contract that you'd signed seven months before gave you the 
right to use that semen to impregnate yourself? 
A It was my understanding, yes, and Michael's. 
ATTY: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
ALJ: All right. And you wanted to call the claimant's sister-
in-law as a witness? 
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ALJ: But would the Supreme Court give an advisory opinion to a 
private party as opposed to being requested by the Federal District 
Court? I don't know either. 
ATTY: No, they won't. 
ALJ: I doubt it. 
ATTY: They won't, because there's nothing. 
ALJ: It would --
ATTY: I'd have to go in and ask for, from what I've read, if I 
go get genetic testing I. can go and get a. District Court to make a 
ruling that Michael is the natural father and that slides it right 
into the Probate Code that he can inherit. And I'd like to say it's 
that simple, but when we were going over this I had to take into cost 
concerns. 
ALJ: Okay. 
ATTY: Because in getting it from in-laws and such and what not. 
ALJ: All right. 
ATTY: But that's probably what we're going to have to do. 
ALJ: Do what you can, Counsel. Let's take testimony from, I'm 
sorry, Ms. Park here. Would you please come, pull a chair up here 
close to the table, Ms. Park, over to the side of the Counsel on the 
other side will work. 
WTN: This? 
ALJ: Yeah, you can sit at that table, no one is using it. 
(The Witness, ELIZABETH PARK, having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows:) 
EXAMINATION OF WITNESS BY ATTORNEY: 
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Q Could you state you name for the Court? 
A Elizabeth Park. 
Q And what is your relationship to the decedent, Michael Burns? 
A He was my brother. 
Q And what is your relationship to Ian Burns? 
A I am his aunt. 
Q And why do you say that? 
A Because he was created with my brother's sperm, with my 
sister-in-law and born to my sister-in-law and that is the way it is. 
He is my nephew. 
Q How many other brothers and sisters do you have? 
A I have three other brothers and one sister. i 
Q And do they all recognize Ian as their nephew? 
A Yes, they do. 
Q Do you have your own children? 
i 
A No. 
Q Do your brothers and sisters, do they have children? 
A Yes, they do. 
Q Do they all consider Ian their cousin? < 
A Yes, they do. 
Q Is he treated any different than any of them? 
A No, not at all. 
Q Your mother and father, how do they look at Ian? 
A He is their grandchild. 
Q Do they treat him any different from any of their other 
grandchildren? ."'•', 
40 
. 242 
A No, they don't. 
Q Prior to your brother's death, did you ever happen to have any 
conversations with him about this semen storage he had with his wife? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What was said? 
A Well, he let me know that they were going to be storing his 
semen and at that point it was for when he recovered. And we also 
talked about if he happened to not recover what he would do and he 
talked about having Gayle have his child after he died. 
• Q He wanted Gayle to have his child if he did not survive the 
treatment and cancer? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Anything else that you could state to the Court that might be 
helpful? 
A Well, I brought along, I guess you could call it evidence of 
our support of Ian as a member of our family. I was married three 
weeks ago and Ian was my ring barer, so I brought pictures. If you 
wanted to reminisce with me. 
ALJ: No, thank you though. No. Congratulations. 
WTN: Thank you. 
ATTY: I have nothing further. 
ALJ: Nothing further. Anything additional on this matter, 
Counsel, other than your briefing this matter? 
ATTY: No, Your Honor. 
ALJ: If you feel strongly that you'd like to see -- I described 
for you the counsel's position. I could just transcribe that portion 
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MEMORANDUM 
Date: October 20,2008 
From: Assistant Regional Commissioner 
Processing Center Operations 
Subject: Administrative Law Judge Decision SSN: 529-49-0701 
NH: Michael A. Burns 
To: Office of Disability Adjudication and Review 
Office of Appellate Operations 
5107 Leesburg Pike 
Falls Church VA 22041-3255 
We request that you review the August 22,2008 Administrative Law Judge (AU) decisions 
finding that Ian M. Burns is entitled to child's benefits and Gayle Burns is entitled to mother's 
benefits on the record of Michael A. Burns, the deceased number holder (NH). The ALT failed to 
follow the guidance of the Office of General Counsel in interpreting the state law of Utah, the 
state in which the number holder was domiciled at the time of his death. The matter under 
consideration is whether a biological child of a NH had established child status under State law 
for legitimacy purposes. In the state of Utah a child bom through in vitro fertilization after the 
death of the number holder would only be recognized under state intestacy laws if the parent 
consented to being aparent "in a record" before the implantation, In this case there was no such 
record established. 
Because Ian M. Burns does not qualify for child's benefits, Gayle Burns cannot be entitled to 
mother's benefits. To be entitled to mother's benefits a claimant must be caring for a child of the 
insured person, and that child must be entitled to child's benefits. 
Our request for review is supported by the Office of General Counsel. As you are aware, the 
decision to review must be made by October 21,2008. 
Please let me know if you wish to discuss this. The staff contacts are Don Parks (510) 970-1425 
and Bob Strouse, (510) 970-1257. 
J& % Jsju^UAX/^s^ 
Stephen Breen 
Assistant Regional Commissioner 
Processing Center Operations 
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Enclosure: Claims Folder 
cc: Office ofthe General Counsel, Denver 
Regional Commissioner, San Francisco 
Regional Commissioner, Denver 
ffikg^ SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
v I l A * Refer to: TLC 
4 
\IST*^ 646-74-5764 Ian M. Burns 
528-47-7242 Gayle Burns 
529-49-0701 CI and E Michael Burns 
Office of Disability Adjudication 
and Review 
5107 Leesburg Pike 
Falls Church, VA 22041-3255 
Telephone: (703)605-8000 
Date: 
AUG 1 9 2009 
NOTICE OF APPEALS COUNCIL DECISION 
UNFAVORABLE 
Ms. Gayle Burns o/b/o herself and 
Mr. Ian M. Burns 
738 Gables Street 
Midvale, UT 84047 
The enclosed decision is the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in your case. 
Please read this notice and the decision carefully. 
If You Disagree With This Decision 
If you disagree with this decision, you may ask for court review by filing a civil action. 
If you do not ask for court review, this decision will be a final decision that can be changed 
only under special rules. 
How To File A Civil Action 
You may file a civil action (ask for court review) by filing a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the judicial district in which you live. The complaint should name the 
Commissioner of Social Security as the defendant and should include the Social Security 
number(s) shown at the top of this letter. 
You or your representative must deliver copies of your complaint and of the summons 
issued by the court to the U.S. Attorney for the judicial district where you file your 
complaint, as provided in rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
You or your representative must also send copies of the complaint and summons, by certified 
or registered mail, to the Social Security Administration's Office of the General Counsel that 
is responsible for the processing and handling of litigation in the particular judicial district in 
which the complaint is filed. The names, addresses, and jurisdictional responsibilities of 
these offices are published in the Federal Register (70 FR 73320, December 9,2005), and are 
available on-line at the Social Security Administration's Internet site, 
http://policv.ssa.gov/poms.nsflinks/0203106020. 
See Next Page 
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You or your representative must also send copies of the complaint and summons, by certified 
or registered mail, to the Attorney General of the United States, Washington, DC 20530. 
Time To File A Civil Action 
• You have 60 days to file a civil action (ask for court review). 
• The 60 days start the day after you receive this letter. We assume you received this letter 
5 days after the date on it unless you show us that you did not receive it within the 5-day 
period. 
• If you cannot file for court review within 60 days, you may ask the Appeals Council to 
extend your time to file. You must have a good reason for waiting more than 60 days to 
ask for court review. You must make the request in writing and give your reason(s) in 
the request. 
You must mail your request for more time to the Appeals Council at the address shown at 
the top of this notice. Please put the Social Security number(s) also shown at the top of this 
notice on your request. We will send you a letter telling you whether your request for more 
time has been granted. 
About The Law 
The right to court review for claims under Title II (Social Security) is provided for in 
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. This section is also Section 405(g) of Title 42 of 
the United States Code. 
The right to court review for claims under Title XVI (Supplemental Security Income) is 
provided for in Section 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act. This section is also Section 
1383(c) of Title 42 of the United States Code. 
The rules on filing civil actions are Rules 4(c) and (i) in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
See Next Page 
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If You Have Any Questions 
Ifyou have any questions, you may call, write, or visit any Social Security office. If you do 
call or visit an office, please have this notice with you. The telephone number of the local 
oflSce that serves your area is (801) 268-1060. Its address is: 
348 East Winchester Street, Suite 100 
Murray, UT 84107-8515 
The staff there is available to assist you. 
Pamela D. Crawford 
Administrative Appeals Judge 
Enclosure(s) 
cc: 
William R.Hadley 
Attorney at Law 
2225 East Murray Holladay Road, #204 
Holladay, UT 84117 
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SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
OFFICE OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION AND REVIEW 
DECISION OF THE APPEALS COUNCIL 
In the case of Claim for 
Gayle Burns o/b/o herself and Child's Insurance Benefits 
IanM. Burns Mother's Insurance Benefits 
(Claimant) 
646-74-5764 Ian M.Burns 
Michael A. Burns 528-47-7242 Gayle Burns 
529-49-0701 CI and E 
(Wage Earner) (Leave Blank if same as above) (Social Security Number) 
Pursuant to 20 CFR 404.988 and 20 CFR 404.989, this case is before the Appeals Council to 
reopen the two hearing decisions of August 22, 2008 issued in connection with Ian Burns' (Ian) 
entitlement to child's insurance benefits and Gayle Burns' (Ms. Burns) entitlement to mother's 
insurance benefits. The Council's action to reopen the hearing decisions is within four years of 
the initial determinations issued on October 2,2005 (Ian, Exhibit 3, p. 10 and Gayle, Exhibit 3, 
p.10).1 The Council found there is good cause to reopen the determinations in these cases 
because the evidence considered in making the determinations clearly shows that the 
Administrative Law Judge's decisions are based on errors. Because both Ian's and Ms. Burns' 
entitlement to benefits is dependent upon Ian's relationship to the wage earner within the 
meaning of the Social Security Act, rather than issuing two decisions, the Council is issuing this 
one decision. 
In deciding to take this action, the Council considered a memorandum from the Western 
Program Service Center (Exhibit AC-1). The Appeals Council notified Ms. Burns and her 
representative of its proposed action and of her rights with respect thereto on February 6, 2009 
(Exhibit AC-2). The Council received a response from the claimant's representative dated 
March 4, 2009, in which he requested copies of the exhibits and the recording of the hearing held 
on October 3, 2007, as well as an extension of time within which to respond to the Council's 
notice (Exhibit AC-3). The Council granted this request on March 12, 2009 (Exhibit AC-4). On 
March 4, 2009 [sic] (actually March 16, 2009), the claimant's representative requested a copy of 
the hearing decision's exhibit list (Exhibit AC-5). The Council sent him such copy on March 24, 
2009 (Exhibit AC-6). On April 20,2009, the claimant's representative submitted an April 17, 
2009 "Memorandum in Opposition," with attachments (Exhibit AC-7). 
1
 Because there are separate evidentiary records for each claimant (i.e., Gayle and Ian), this notice refers to exhibits 
based on the particular claimant's record. 
See Next Page 
Ian M. Burns (646-74-5764) Page 2 of 10 
«• 
In response to the Appeals Council's notice of proposed action dated February 6, 2009, the 
claimant's representative referred to the portion of the memorandum from the Western Program 
Service Center which indicates that: 
In the state of Utah a child born through in vitro fertilization after the death 
of the number holder would only be recognized under state intestacy laws if 
the parent consented to being a parent "in a record" before the implantation. 
In this case there was no such record established (Exhibit AC-1). 
The representative argued that the wage earner consented to being a parent "in a record" which 
was established prior to his death. He contended that such record consisted of the wage earner's 
providing sperm for assisted reproduction by Gayle Burns, his wife; signing and consenting to 
the use of his sperm for assisted reproductive purposes; and indicating that, in the event of his 
death, he would like his vials of sperm "[maintained in storage for further donation to Gayle 
Burns (fill in name and relationship) who will assume all of the obligations and terms described 
in this contract" (Gayle, Exhibit 6, pp.2-3). The representative further contended that any 
ambiguities in the contract and/or the wage earner's intentions were resolved by testimony and 
statements from Ms. Burns and the wage earner's sister, Elizabeth Park, who indicated that the 
wage earner had discussed with them, as well as other members of his family that he "wished to 
have his wife utilize his frozen semen for assisted reproduction upon his death" (Exhibit AC-7). 
The Appeals Council does not find these contentions persuasive. 
The memorandum from the Western Program Service Center (Exhibit AC-1) constitutes a 
referral of these eases to the Appeals Council for possible consideration and/or review of the 
hearing decisions under 20 CFR 404.969(b) and (c). Such memoranda consist of the opinion of 
the referring component, with which the Appeals Council may or may not agree. Regardless of 
the reason(s) provided for the referral, the Council's decision to review a case is made 
independently and pursuant to criteria expressly stated in the Social Security regulations at 20 
CFR 404.970 and, as applicable, 404.987. As indicated previously, the Appeals Council asserted 
its own motion authority because the Administrative Law Judge's decisions are based on errors 
of law (20 CFR 404.970(a)(2)). Such errors as well as the Council's consideration of the 
representative's arguments are discussed below. 
The Administrative Law Judge decided that "the claimant, Ian Burns, born December 23,2003, 
is entitled to surviving dependent child's benefits pursuant to 42 USC §§ 402, et seq. and 
20 CFR 404.535, based upon the earnings record of the insured wage earner, Michael Burns, 
beginning from the date of the claimant's birth." 
The Administrative Law Judge further decided that Gayle Burns is "entitled to mother's 
survivorship benefits under 42 USC §§ 402(g)(1), based on the earnings record of the insured 
from the time of claimant's birth, when the claimant became an eligible mother." 
The Appeals Council incorporates the Administrative Law Judge's statement of the evidence in 
this case, and his references to provisions of the Social Security Act and the regulations of the 
Social Security Administration, as supplemented herein. 
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ISSUES 
The issues before the Appeals Council are whether Ian M. Burns is entitled to child's insurance 
benefits and whether Gayle Burns is entitled to mother's insurance benefits on the record of the 
deceased wage earner. 
After considering all the evidence of record, pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations, 
the Appeals Council has concluded that Ian is not the child of the wage earner within the 
meaning of the Social Security Act, and that therefore Ian is not entitled to child's insurance 
benefits and Ms. Burns is not entitled to mother's insurance benefits. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
In addition to the records before the Administrative Law Judge, the Appeals Council has 
considered and entered into the records the following information: 
Exhibit AC-1 A memorandum from (he Western Program Service Center dated 
October 20,2008 
Exhibit AC-2 A copy of the Appeals Council's notice to the claimant dated 
February 6,2009 
Exhibit AC-3 A letter from the claimant's representative to the Appeals Council 
dated March 4, 2009 
Exhibit AC-4 A copy of the Appeals Council's letter to the claimant's 
representative dated March 12,2009 
Exhibit AC-5 A letter from the claimant's representative to the Appeals Council 
dated March 4,2009 [sic] (actually March 16,2009) 
Exhibit AC-6 A copy of a letter from the Appeals Council to the claimant's 
representative dated March 24,2009, with attachments 
Exhibit AC-7 A letter from the claimant's representative to the Appeals Council 
with attachments dated April 17, 2009 
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
The evidentiary records contain information that indicates that, in April 2000, the wage earner 
was diagnosed with cancer. As part ofhis medical therapy, he had sperm cryopreserved. As part 
of the contract for the procedure, the wage earner indicated that, in the event ofhis death, his 
semen was to be transferred to his wife, Gayle Burns (Ms. Burns) (Ian, Exhibit 6, pp. 1-5 and 7). 
On May 3,2003, the Reproductive Care Center transferred two of nine embryos, which resulted 
from the insemination of her eggs with the wage earner's sperm, to Ms. Burns, which resulted in 
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her pregnancy. The remaining seven embryos were frozen for possible later use. Ian was born 
approximately four weeks early on December 23,2003 (Ian, Exhibit 6, p.6 and Exhibit 8). 
On September 24,2004, Ms. Burns filed an application for child's insurance benefits on behalf 
of her son, Ian M. Burns (Ian), on the record of the wage earner who died on March 24, 2001 
(Ian Exhibits 1,2 and 7). On the same day, she also filed an application for mother's insurance 
benefits on the basis that she had an entitled child of the wage earner in her care (Gayle, Exhibit 
I). The evidentiary records show that Ms. Burns and the wage earner were married on August 
24,1997 and that their marriage ended with his death on March 24, 2001 (Ian, Exhibits 5 and 7). 
The Social Security Administration determined that Ian is not the child of the wage earner within 
the meaning of the Social Security Act, and that he is not entitled to child's insurance benefits 
(Ian, Exhibit 3, p. 10). The Agency also determined that Ms. Burns was not entitled to mother's 
benefits (Gayle, Exhibit 3, p. 10). In requesting reconsideration, Ms. Burns' representative 
contended that Ian had status as child of the wage earner within the meaning of the Act, "[b]ased 
on the ruling in the 9th District Court (sic)," and "documentation from Michael stating what he 
wanted done with his sperm after death" (Ian, Exhibit 3, p.8). 
On May 16, 2006, the Agency affirmed its initial determinations upon reconsideration (Ian, 
Exhibit 3). It determined that the representative's contentions were not persuasive. The Agency 
observed that the ruling of the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Gillett-Netting only applied to 
states in that Circuit (i.e., Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon and Washington). Because Utah is not in the 9th Circuit, the 
ruling does not apply in this case (see Social Security Acquiescence Ruling (AR) 05-1(9) and 20 
CFR 404.985 regarding the Agency's application of circuit court law). 
In concluding that Ian is not the child of the wage earner within the meaning of the Social 
Security Act, the Social Security Administration determined that, because the wage earner died 
prior to Ian's conception and birth, he had not acknowledged Ian as his son in writing; that there 
is no court order of paternity and/or support issued before the wage earner's death; and that, 
although Ian is the wage earner's biological child, there is no evidence that the wage earner 
either lived with Ian or contributed to Ian's support prior to his death (section 216(h)(3) of the 
Social Security Act). 
The Agency further determined that Ian would not have inheritance rights in the wage 
earner's estate under the laws of the State of Utah because he was neither conceived nor born 
during Ms. Burns' marriage to the wage earner, which lasted from August 24,1997 to March 24, 
2001, and that, in order to inherit in the State of Utah, a child must have been conceived and/or 
born prior to the putative parent's death (Ian, Exhibit 3, p.2). The Agency further determined, 
both initially and upon reconsideration, that Ms. Burns' was not entitled to mother's insurance 
benefits because she did not have an entitled child of the wage earner in her care (Gayle, Exhibit 
3, pp. 3-10). Ms. Burns filed a request for hearing in response to the unfavorable reconsidered 
determinations (Ian, Exhibit 3, p. 1 and Gayle, Exhibit 3, p. 1). 
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Post-hearing, but before the decision was issued, Ms. Bums submitted information indicating 
that, prior to his death, the wage earner, herself, the wage earner's sister and other immediate 
family members discussed his situation. During these discussions, the wage earner expressed 
"his desire for Gayle Bums to conceive a child by in vitro fertilization using his sperm and thus 
would leave his own child in this world by and with his wife, Gayle Bums" (Gayle, Exhibit 20, 
p.5). 
However, there is no evidence that the wage earner expressed this intent in writing. Ms. Bums 
submitted various court documents from the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, which held that the wage earner intended that she use his semen for in 
vitro fertilization, that Ian is the biological child of the wage earner and is recognized as such by 
his family, and that "all rights arising from said parent/child relationship including those of care, 
custody, support and inheritance are hereby granted for the benefit of Ian M. Burns, a minor" 
(Gayle, Exhibits 18 and 20, p.2). 
The claimant's representative contended that, "when there is a question on inheritance, a birth 
certificate is sufficient to establish inheritance rights," and that Ian's birth certificate showing the 
wage earner as his biological father, as well as the court orders, are sufficient to establish his 
inheritance rights in the wage earner's estate (Gayle, Exhibit 19). 
In his decisions, the Administrative Law Judge reasoned that Ian is the legitimate child of 
the deceased wage earner because, although not bom during Ms. Bums' marriage to the wage 
earner and not within 300 days of his death, the wage earner intended his sperm to be used by 
Ms. Bums to have his child, based upon his providing of such sperm and his discussions with her 
and his family. Because Ian is the wage earner's legitimate child, the Administrative Law Judge 
concluded that he is entitled to child's insurance benefits on the wage earner's record. 
The Administrative Law Judge reasoned that Ian would have inheritance rights in the wage 
earner's estate because Ian is his biological child, that a court in the State of Utah held that Ian is 
the child of the wage earner and that the wage earner "consented to assisted reproduction by his 
wife, which resulted in the birth of the child" (Ian Decision, p.7) The Administrative Law Judge 
also reasoned that, because the wage earner entered into a marriage with Ms. Bums prior to his 
death, the laws of the State of Utah would recognize Ian as a child of her marriage to the wage 
earner. 
As indicated above, the Administrative Law Judge issued decisions finding that Ian is the child 
of the wage earner within the meaning of the Social Security Act, that he is entitled to child's 
insurance benefits on the record of the deceased wage earner, and that, because Ms. Bums has an 
entitled child of the wage earner in her care, Ms. Bums is entitled to mother's insurance benefits. 
From its review of the evidentiary record, as well as the pertinent sections of the Social Security 
Act and the laws of the State of Utah, the Appeals Council finds that the hearing decisions are 
erroneous as a matter of law. As such, the Council has concluded that Ian does not have status as 
the child of the wage earner within the meaning of the Social Security Act, that he is not entitled 
to Social Security child's insurance benefits, and therefore Gayle Bums does not have an entitled 
child of the wage earner in her care and is not entitled to mother's insurance benefits. 
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If an individual is a child of the wage earner but is not the child of the wage earner under section 
216(h)(2)(A) of the Act, such individual shall be deemed to be the child of the wage earner if the 
wage earner and the child's mother went through a marriage ceremony (section 216(h)(2)(B) of 
the Social Security Act). 
The records show that the wage earner died on March 24,2001 (Ian, Exhibit 7 and Gayle, 
Exhibit 8); therefore, Ms. Burns and the wage earner were not married at the time Ian was 
conceived in May 2003 and born on December 23,2003 (Ian, Exhibit 6, p.6). The Appeals Council 
finds that Ian does not have status as the child of the wage earner under section 216(h)(2)(B) of the 
Act. 
An applicant who is the child of a wage earner, but who is not the child of the wage earner under 
section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act, will nevertheless be deemed to be the child of the wage earner if, in 
the case of a deceased wage earner, such wage earner has acknowledged in writing that the child is 
his son, has been decreed by a court to be the father of the child, or has been ordered by a court to 
contribute to the support of the child because the child is his son, and such acknowledgement, court 
decree, or court order was made before the death of the wage earner (section 216(h)(3)(C)(i) of the 
Social Security Act), 
The Appeals Council finds that Ian does not have status as the child of the wage earner under 
section 216(h)(3)(C)(i) of the Act because the wage earner was unable to acknowledge Ian as his 
son in writing and no court orders of paternity and/or support were issued prior to his death. 
Alternately, a child can establish his relationship if the wage earner is shown by evidence 
satisfactory to the Commissioner to be the father of the child and was living with or contributing to 
the support of the child at the time the wage earner died (section 216(h)(3)(C)(ii) of the Social 
Security Act). 
Although the record shows that Ian is the biological child of the wage earner, and that this is not in 
dispute (Ian, Exhibit 6 and Gayle, Exhibit 6), the wage earner neither lived with nor contributed to 
Ian's support during Ms. Burns' pregnancy or after Ian's birth. The Appeals Council finds that Ian 
does not have status as child of the wage earner under section 216(h)(3)(C)(ii) of the Act. 
A child is entitled to benefits on the earnings record of an insured wage earner who has died if 
the child could inherit the wage earner's property under the intestacy laws of the state in which 
he was domiciled when he died. Social Security Act § 216(h)(2)(A). In determining whether a 
child can inherit a wage earner's property, the Commissioner applies the version of state law that 
Is in effect when the claim is being adjudicated. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(b)(4).1 
*If the child cannot inherit under the version of State law in effect at the time of 
adjudication, then the Commissioner may apply the version of state law that was in effect 
when the insured died, or any version of state law in effect from the date the application 
was filed up until the Commissioner's final decision on the application to determine whether 
a child can inherit a number holder's property. Id. Here, however, the claimant could not inherit under 
Utah law in effect at the time oftheNH's death (in 2001), as it required that the claimant be in 
gestation at the time of the NH's death in order to inherit by intestate succession. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 75-2-101, 75-2-108. Since the claimant was conceived through artificial 
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As such, the Appeals Council applies the current Utah law, which, as amended in 2005, 
provides: 
If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the deceased 
spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented 
in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased 
spouse would be a parent of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-707 (previously numbered as § 78-45g-707).2 The term "record," as 
used in this statute, is defined as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is 
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-15-102(22). "'Parent' means an individual who has established a parent-child 
relationship under Section 78B-15-201." Id. at 102(17). In relevant part, § 78B-15-201 provides 
that a parent-child relationship is established between a man and a child where the "man having 
consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7, Assisted Reproduction [e.g., 
§ 78B-15-707], which resulted in the birth of the child." See zW. at § 78B-15-201 (e). 
In this case^  the wage earner died before placement of the sperm and did not consent in a 
"record" to be the "parent" of the child in the event of his death. In finding to the contrary, the 
Administrative Law Judge relied upon a Semen Storage Agreement the wage earner entered into 
prior to his death, which states, in relevant part: 
I. In the event of the death of the donor the donor would like his vials of 
semen (initial one of the items below): 
a. Destroyed (Blank) 
b. Maintained in storage for future donation to Gavle Burns \the 
NH's wife) (fill in name and relationship) who will assume all of 
N the obligations and terms described in this contract. (NH's initials). 
See, Semen Storage Agreement § I. This agreement, while expressing the wage earner's intent to 
donate the cryopreserved sperm and its related contractual obligations to his wife in the event of 
his death, is not sufficient to show that the NH actually consented to being the "parent" of the 
child pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-707, a fact which the Administrative Law Judge 
acknowledges. See, Decision at 6 ("The Semen Storage Agreement does not contain the specific 
language of parentage...."). 
In making his findings and decision, the Administrative Law Judge relied on extraneous 
evidence (Decision at 6) not a part of the contract (parol evidence) such as testimony about 
previous oral conversations between the wage earner and his family, to bolster his finding that 
wage earner intended to be the posthumously conceived child's "parent," as the statute 
methods after the death of the NH, he would not qualify as an Intestate heir under Utah law 
in effect as of the NH's death. Id. 
2Utah is one of several states to adopt this provision from the Uniform Parentage Act. 
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specifically requires that the consent be in a written or otherwise retrievable "record." Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78B-15-707, 78B-15-102(22). Furthermore, the Semen Storage Agreement in this 
case contains an integration/merger provision expressly precluding reference to outside evidence 
in construing its terms, stating that it "represents the entire agreement between parties and there 
are no understandings, agreements, or representations other than as set forth herein." See Semen 
Storage Agreement § S. The Appeals Council concludes that, based on the Utah State's 
definition of "record", the Administrative Law Judge should not have considered the extraneous 
evidence in making his determination. 
As indicated in the Appeals Council's notice of February 6,2009, the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code (the Code) makes no statutory provision for inheritance for individuals, such as Ian, 
procreated through artificial methods (such as artificial insemination), after the death of a 
decedent. From its review of the laws of the State of Utah, the Council concluded that, under 
Utah's rules of statutory construction, this omission indicates non-coverage, and that it 
eliminates from the class of those who can inherit by intestate succession any children procreated 
through artificial methods after the death of a decedent. Because Ian was procreated through 
artificial methods after the death of the wage earner, the Council finds that he does not qualify as 
an intestate heir under Utah State law. 
The claimant's representative has also contended that Ian has status as child of the wage earner 
under section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act because a court in the State of Utah 
ordered that the wage earner is Ian's father, that Ian is his heir and that, as such, Ian has 
inheritance rights in the wage earner's estate. The Appeals Council does not find this contention 
persuasive. 
The Social Security Administration is not bound by the State court's findings as to 
paternity and intestacy in this case. The Agency must follow a State court's decision only 
when four prerequisites are met: 1) an issue in a claim for Social Security benefits has been 
determined by a state court of competent jurisdiction; 2) the issue was genuinely contested 
before the State court by parties with opposing interests; 3) the issue falls within the general 
category of domestic relations law; and 4) the resolution by the State trial court is consistent with 
the law enunciated by the highest court in the State. See, Program Operations Manual System 
GN § 00306.001(C)(3) and Social Security Ruling 83-37c (discussing Gray v. Richardson, 414 
F.2d 1370 (1973)). Here, although the Utah court has determined the issue of paternity and that 
issue falls within the general category of domestic relations, under (1) and (3) above, the other 
two requirements have not been satisfied. 
The issues were not "genuinely contested" by parties with opposing interests under (2). Rather, 
both relevant issues decided by the Utah court, paternity and the child's intestate inheritance 
status, were undisputed. Indeed, the State court judge's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law" as to paternity state that the special administrator of the wage earner's estate as well as the 
wage earner's "family including grandparents, uncles, cousins, nephews and nieces, all 
openly recognize [the child] as their grandchild, nephew and cousin and the natural son of [the 
wage earner]." Because the relevant issues were not rendered in a contested proceeding, the 
Agency is not bound by the State court's findings. Gray, 474 F.2d at 1373. 
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With regard to Gray as set forth in the requirement at (4) above, the Appeals Council is of the 
opinion that the State court's determination in this case is inconsistent with the law as would be 
enunciated by the highest court of the State. The Council is unaware of any Utah case actually 
construing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-707, but believes that the highest court would agree with 
its analysis above, and would conclude that the Semen Storage Agreement in this particular case 
was insufficient to show that the wage earner consented in a "record" to be the "parent" of a 
child produced from that semen after his death. As such, the Agency is not bound by the State 
court's findings. Id. 
* FINDINGS 
After careful consideration of the evidence of record, the Appeals Council finds: 
1. The wage earner died on March 24,2001. 
2. After the wage earner's death, Gayle Burns became pregnant through a 
process of in vitro fertilization using the wage earner's cryopreserved sperm. 
3. Ian M. Burns isthe biological child of the deceased wage earner. 
4. Ian M. Burns was born on December 23,2003. 
5. Ian M. Burns would not have inheritance rights in the wage earner's estate 
Under the laws of the State of Utah. 
6. Ian M. Burns was neither conceived nor born during the marriage between 
Gayle Burns and the wage earner. 
7. No court issued an order of paternity and/or support prior to the wage earner's 
death, finding that he was the father of Ian M. Burns. 
8. The wage earner neither lived with nor contributed to the support of Ian M. 
Burns during Gayle Burns' pregnancy or after he was born. 
9. Ian M. Burns is not the child of the wage earner within the meaning of the 
Social Security Act. 
10. Ian M. Burns is not entitled to child's insurance benefits. 
11. Gayle Burns does not have an entitled child of the wage earner in her care. 
12. Gayle Burns is not entitled to mother's insurance benefits. 
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, Ian M. Burns (646-74-5764) Page 10 of 10 1 6 
and Gayle Burns is not entitled to mother's insurance benefits under sections 202(d) and 202(g), 
respectively, of title II of the Social Security Act. 
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WELLIAMR. HADLEY #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Road, Suite 204 
Holladay.UT 84117 
Telephone: (801) 277-4292 
Facsimile: (801)277-4295 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
Deceased. 
PETITION FOR ADJUDICATION OF 
INTESTACY, DETERMINATION OF 
HERS, AND APPOINTMENT OF 
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 
Probate No. 
Judge 
, by and through counsel, William R. Hadley, COMES NOW the petitioner# 
and represents to the Registrar that: 
1. Applicant's interest in this matter is that of: 
A)~ An heir of the decedent. 
B) A child of the decedent. 
C) A devisee of the decedent's will. 
D)JL The spouse of the decedent 
E) _ A creditor of the decedent 
F) A person having priority for appointment as personal representative. 
\^J 
^ 
G) _ A person having a property right in or a claim against the decedent's estate. 
H) A fiduciary representing an interested person. 
2. The decedent ,40 fcpf f^gpBB)f l^^BHNM0Mt, at the age of J 
3. Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this 
county. 
4. The names and addressed of the spouse, children, heirs, and devisees of the decedent, 
and the ages of those who are minors so far as known or ascertainable with 
reasonable diligence by applicant, are as follows: 
NAME ADDRESS AGE RELATIONSHIP 
Adult Spouse 
#years 
Adult 
Son 
Sister 
5. 
6. 
No personal representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere. 
The appointment of a special administrator is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest 
with the estate in a related matter presently before j f l t H H R B H ^ H f l P m *he 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah under Case 
i which is a proceeding to determine the paternity of the minor child, 
Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination 
of Heirs, and Appointment ofSpecialAdministrator 
Probate No. 
•\J 
10. 
11. 
That ' g f l f l f l H P i f l P B H H H Q the person to be appointed as Special 
Administrator is decedent's-sister and is qualified to act as such. 
Applicant has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice of any probate 
or appointment proceeding concerning the decedent that may have been filed in this 
state or elsewhere. 
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3-107(2) there are no statutes of limitation to determine 
heirs of an estate and such petition is proper. 
Pursuant to U.C.A, § 75-3-107(3) there is a presumption of intestacy as no will has 
been probated within three years from date of the decedent's death. 
That notice to creditors should be waived. 
12. That bond should be waived. 
13. That all other notices, except those specifically referenced herein, should be waived. 
WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT: 
1. That the Court enter an Order of Intestacy of this estate. 
2. Thst^///////////^ 
3. T h e f l l H M H H I H H B b e appointed special administrator in reference to 
Third District Court Case No. 074904953. 
DATED this day of February, 2008. 
WILLIAM R.HADLEY 
PeMonfor Adjudication of Intestacy, Determination 
of Heirs, and Appointment of Special Administrator 
Probate No. 3 
w 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of SALT LAKE ) 
If Applicant is Individual 
Applicant, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing petition are true, 
accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this / f day of February, 2008, n, 
\*mm 
Notary Public ; 
WILLIAM B.HAQLEY 8 
2225 East Murray HoHadoy Road «04 s 
Salt Uk8 City, Uteh 84117 1 
My Commission Expires . 
August 08,2000 I 
L» «« mm^^^S^J^L .» «J 
4 
i 
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WILLIAM R. HADLEY* #5282 
HADLEY & HADLEY, L.L.C. 
2225 E Murray Holladay Road #204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 '•• 
Telephone: (801) 277-4292 
Facsimile: (801) 277-4295 . ••; 
Attorney for Applicant 
£ 
* . - • % 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF j 
Deceased. 
INFORMAL AD JUDICATION OF 
INTESTACY, DETERMINATION OF 
HEIRS, AND APPOINTMENT OF 
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 
Proba teNo:0£5^ O ^ B 
Judge 
Upon consideration of the Informal Appointment of Special Administrator filed by W h 
spouse of the decedent, on me 1 today of February, 2008, the Registrar finds that: 
1. The application is complete and complies with the provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code. 
2. Good cause for the request for appointment has been shown. 
3.. Any required notice has been given or waived. 
4. The applicant has made an oath or affirmation that the statements contained in the 
application are, true to the best of her knowledge and belief. 
W=" \J 
5. The applicant appears from the application to be an interested person as defined 
M ^ 
6. Onthe basis ofthe statements inthe application, venue is proper. 
7. J B I B H l B H H B M f l ^ is the proper person to act as special administrator. 
8. Bond is not required of is waived. 
9. On the basis ofthe statements in the application: 
a. > X No personal representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere. 
10. It appears from the application that the time limit for informal appointment has 
not expired. 
11.•.'•••'• On the basis of the statements in the application, the decedent died intestate. 
12. Based on the statements inthe application, the person whose appointment as 
ispecial administrator is sought is qualified to act as special administrator and has a 
prior right to appointment. 
13. That the decedent left as heirs his wife, 6 t f H 0 H H L petitioner, and a minor 
son,VMN^^pNlHVV0MMflHflP^Mi 
NOW, THEREFORE: 
1. That the decedent died intestate. 
2. That the heirs are * 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR -
In the Matter ofthe Estate of MICHAEL A. BURNS 
Probate No. 2 
w W: 
3. lis hereby appointed special administrator of the estate of 
decedent, to act without bond, to assist the estate in any conflicts of interests that 
may arise in a related matter in 'the Third Judicial District Coiirt Case No. 
> before the Honorablel 
6. Upon qualification and acceptance, letters of special administration shall be 
••• •' issued.-'. 
DATED this 1^? day of February, 2008. 
Registrar f\ 
BvBV: y f ' 
STAMP i ^ E D AT Dtl 
I GERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF 
AN ORIGINAL 00CUMENT ON RLE IN THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE 
COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH E 
n/.Tf 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR 
In the Matter of the Estate of MICHAEL A. BURNS 
Probate No. 3 
o-
( X 
tyy* 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY #5282 * 
HADLEY AND HADLEY, L.C. 
2225 E. Murray Holladay Rd., Ste 204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Telephone: (801) 277-4292 . 
Facsimile: (801)277-4295 
Attorney for Applicant 
IN THE THDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) _ O F ADMINISTRATION 
; X ) Y OF SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
• ' ' • • . ' • . - . • « • • • • 
• . ' • " • • • . . • . • . . . . 
J"--. ProbateNo: : 0 ^ > f t 0 0 2^> -
'. Judge 
1- JBMMtMttflMflflB> was dirty appointed and quaM 
'•'., General Personal Representative 
_JL Special Administrator 
of the estate of the above-named decedent on the Jf2day of February, 2008, by the: • 
-
:
.•;>.;. •;•.;• X e o u r t , .: ' ^ ( v ^ 
_Registrar, with ; ;."..'•'•*• -;V. -' 
_ a l l authority pertaining thereto. :: 
W 
m 
r\ 
_ all authority pertaining thereto, except. 
2. Administration of the estate is: 
a) 2L unsupervised. 
b) _ supervised. The above-named personal representative or special 
administrator may not make any distribution of the estate without prior court 
order. 
These letters are issued to evidence the appointment, qualification, and authority of the 
said special administrator. 
WITNESS, my signature and the Seal of this Court, this ¥b day of February, 
or Registrar of th< 
By: 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE.IN THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY. STATE.OF UTAH. 
DATE- / p g i 
LETTERS 
Estate of Michael A. Burns 
Case No.: 
